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This dissertation consists of three chapters on labor and development economics.
The first two chapters investigates a particular type of safety net in rural Ethiopia,
namely the presence of food aid programs. The role of food aid has played an impor-
tant role in Ethiopia, and many developing countries, for disaster relief, development,
and as a means to reduce vulnerability to agricultural shocks. The first two chapters
of the dissertation investigates who the beneficiaries of aid programs are. Chapter
1 investigates the targeting mechanisms used to identify which households are eli-
gible for aid and once selected what criteria are used to determine aid allocations.
When discretion is given in selecting recipients and aid allocations, agency prob-
lems may arise. Chapter 2 moves away from targeting issues and investigates the
potential health effects aid can have on labor market participants, adult men and
women. Chapter 3 uses U.S. data to examine the hypothesis that non-benevolent,
self-employed households increase their expected family size to raise the likelihood
that an inside family member will be a good match at running the business. Hence,




Aid and Agency in Africa: Explaining Food Disbursements
Across Ethiopian Households, 1994-2004.
2.1 Introduction
African aid has been receiving a lot of attention. Heated debates center on whether
more aid to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is a solution to the problems of acute
poverty and malnutrition in this region. Some argue that massive injections of foreign
aid to African countries build dependency, foster corruption and weaken the basis for
efficient trade flows, while others support aid as an indispensable tool for alleviating
poverty in the world’s poorest countries. A proper understanding of the role of
foreign aid in Africa relies on a knowledge of how existing allocations of food aid are
distributed across regions and households. If current allocations are directed towards
needy households, one might be optimistic about the effects of future flows. Serious
targeting deficiencies on the other hand, would suggest that attention to improved
monitoring systems should accompany higher levels of aid. We contribute to the aid
debate by examining the relationship between free food disbursements and household
characteristics in rural Ethiopia, a region of the world which has come to be known
both for its vulnerability to agricultural shocks and sizable aid flows.
Although regional targeting and donor incentives to provide food aid have been
2
3
well studied1, the literature on intra-village food allocations is quite limited. Clay et
al.(1999) uses cross-sectional data from a nationally representative survey of house-
holds conducted in the mid-nineties and finds no significant relationship between
household food insecurity and aid. This is attributed to female and elderly headed
households receiving food aid regardless of need and to aid being concentrated in
historically deficit areas. In Jayne et al. (2002), the same data is used to distinguish
between the hypothesis of ’chronic needs’, where areas in Ethiopia with a history of
drought and famine receive the bulk of food aid, with the ’inertia’ hypothesis, under
which the distribution of aid is governed by the existing network of aid distribution
centers. Sharp (1997) highlights the cultural norms prevalent in many African soci-
eties to share wealth; there appears to be a tendency for local representatives to be
equitable in aid allocations and that in villages where inequitable selection criteria
were used, households often redistributed aid among themselves.2
Although the precise mechanism for the allocation of food aid in Ethiopia remains
unclear, official documents suggest that there are at least two levels at which food
needs are assessed, the Wereda or district level and the household level. Members
representing the government, international donors, and non-government organiza-
tions conduct Wereda level assessments while representatives within villages identify
needy households. The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC)
is the official body that is responsible for the allocation of food aid and, on the basis
of its guidelines for aid disbursements, it appears to be fairly committed to serving
those in need. Most aid however is routed through peasant associations (PAs), which
cover several villages and are the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia. We are in-
1For a discussion of area targeting by donor countries refer to Barrett (2001), Shapouri and Missiaen (1990), and
Zahariadis et al. (2000). Jayne et al. (2002) describes aid allocations across districts within Ethiopia.
2Dercon and Krishnan (2003) is related in that it shows that imperfect targeting can be remedied with village
level risk-sharing.
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terested in the manner in which these village bodies allocate food aid in the presence
of some monitoring by the DPPC. This type of community-level targeting at the vil-
lage level is common in many African countries where community leaders have been
historically important and information flows between villages and higher levels of
government are limited. Anthropological studies for Ethiopia show that community
members do have knowledge of the needs of different families [Sharp, 1997], but the
effectiveness with which they use this information has been debated and criticized.3
We use a framework that incorporates the potential trade-off between the richer in-
formational set possessed by the local representatives and their incentives to transfer
resources to households to whom they are connected or to those capable of provid-
ing them reciprocal transfers or greater influence. Several researchers have explored
the theoretical case for decentralizing the delivery of public services. Bardhan and
Mookherjee (1998) provide a theoretical framework that compares the trade-off be-
tween the informational advantages of delegating the tasks to lower level authorities
and the lack of accountability that local elites have to the poor and show that the
theoretical case for decentralization depends on the degree of local capture by local
elites. Galasso and Ravallion (2000) model the behavior of local organizations and
find some support for capture by the elites when public spending is on a private
good. We build on the previous studies by investigating the role of informal power
within African villages in determining food disbursements.
Our data comes from six rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS)
conducted between the years 1994 to 2004. We construct a panel data set of about
800 households living in eleven peasant associations that were chosen so as to cover
3As Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen point out:
The leaders of a village community undoubtedly have a lot of information relevant for appropriate
selection. But...there is also the question as to whether [they] have strong enough motivation - or
incentives-to give adequately preferential treatment to vulnerable groups... [Dreze and Sen, 1991].
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all major farming systems in the country. We focus on the distribution of free aid
as opposed to food-for-work and are interested in two specific questions: First, were
aid recipients poorer and more vulnerable than other households? Second, within
the set of recipients were there systematic influences in the quantity of aid allocated
and in particular, did allocations work to equalize income across households?
We find clear evidence that the probability of receiving aid decreases with higher
levels of income. While households at the 25th percentile of the income distribution
have an average probability of 60 percent of receiving aid, at the 75th percentile
this probability falls to 32 percent. These estimates suggest that community rep-
resentatives have information on household need and use it to identify recipients.
Conditional on receiving free food aid, however, food aid receipts are uncorrelated
with income but are correlated with a measure of self-reported power available from
one of the survey rounds. Within the set of recipients, it is the more powerful house-
holds that receive a disproportionate share of food aid. These empirical patterns are
consistent with a model in which the DPPC does monitor PAs but can observe the
set of aid recipients much more easily than their precise aid needs. PAs in turn favor
households that provide influence in ways that are least observable to the monitoring
agency.
A standard problem with studies of targeting is that income is often measured with
error and, in our setting, may be endogenous if aid affects productivity or incentives
to work. We use land and livestock ownership as instrumental variables to check
the robustness of these results. The estimated effect of income on the probability of
receiving aid is larger under these specifications suggesting that income may in fact
be endogenous or measured with error. Our results are also robust to the inclusions
of time-varying village level fixed effects.
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We believe that these findings form a significant addition to the literature on the
determinants and the effects of food aid in Africa. Most studies using household
level data agree that Food for Work programs reach primarily poor households while
Free Distribution is found to do only marginally better, on average, than a random
allocation of aid across households [Clay et al., 1999, Quisumbing, 2003]. Our richer
data set (large number of households within villages, repeated observations on the
same villages and households and measures of informal village level influence) and
a conceptual framework which makes a distinction between aid receipts and aid
recipients may account for these different findings.
We proceed in the next section with a brief institutional history of organizations
involved in the allocation of food aid in Ethiopia. A theoretical framework is pre-
sented in Section 3, followed by a description of the data in section 4. Our empirical
specification is in Section 5 and results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 The administration of food aid in Ethiopia
The governmental organization which overseas the Wereda level assessment is
the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), formerly known as
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The DPPC was established in response
to the famine of 1973/1974 in the northern part of Ethiopia. Its activities were
aimed at preventing disasters and reducing individual and household vulnerability
to agricultural shocks. A primary goal of the DPPC is to direct resources towards
addressing the root causes of vulnerability to famine and food shortages by linking
relief with development. The effectiveness of food aid targeting is viewed as crucial
to its success.
The DPPC, along with help from international donors and NGOs conduct detailed
7
assessments of weather conditions, crop production, livestock availability, wage labor
opportunities, and market prices for chronically needy districts.4 Assessments are
carried out at least twice a year to capture the two primary agricultural seasons.
Districts which are not classified as chronically needy, conduct their own assessments
and report their estimated need to the DPPC. National guidelines issued by the
DPPC suggest criteria for determining needy households but discretion has always
been given to local level representatives. The first guidelines, issued in 1979 stated
that in times of natural disaster, priority should go to households with no assets or
alternative sources of income and the lowest priority group were households who had
food resources but needed rehabilitation assistance. When enough resources were
available, all affected households were to receive aid with the highest priority group
receiving more per person.
After two updates to the original 1979 guidelines and the famine of 1984/1985,
the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management was passed in 1993
[TGE, 1993]. Groups explicitly mentioned in the document as requiring special as-
sistance are the old, the disabled, lactating and pregnant women, and persons who
are required to attend to young children. Discretion for identifying needy households
remained with representatives of the PA. A committee of PA elders and representa-
tives, with local knowledge of the area and of individual need, were to report their
assessments to the Wereda Administration. The sixth round of the Ethiopian Rural
Household Survey, which will be described in detail in Section 2.4, asks household
heads and village representatives for criteria that they believe are used in identifying
aid recipients. Appendix A lists the top five responses for each group. The old, the
poor and the disabled are ranked in the top five by both village members and village
4A chronoically needy district is a district which has needed food aid assistance for a number of consecutive years.
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representatives.
It is sometimes argued that in a poor country like Ethiopia where approximately
50 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line, the targeting of aid
is not important because everyone is in need of assistance. Using an average poverty
line of 600 birr per capita for food consumption [Dercon and Krishnan, 1998], Table 1
shows that between 20 and 50 percent of the sampled households did not have enough
food consumption to meet their basic needs.5 Also note that this fraction varied
considerably across villages and across time within the same village. Table 2 depicts
the within village variation of annual income per capita and annual consumption per
capita.6 The shaded areas in the table represent the round the village received aid.7
The figures in these two tables emphasize the importance of well-targeted aid and
the difficulties in a top-down approach to allocations: Village and household needs
vary considerably from one period to the next and coverage is far from complete.
This suggests the importance of looking closely at issues of targeting.
2.3 A principal-agent framework
A proper assessment of needs requires a great deal of information that is hard
to obtain outside the village. Income, disability, age, land quality and networks of
household support all jointly determine the the optimal distribution of aid. The
challenge faced by benevolent donors is to take advantage of local knowledge while
minimizing misappropriation. To understand the type of misallocation that might
occur, we model this as a problem in which a principal (the DPPC or an international
5 1 U.S. dollar equaled approximately 6.00 birr in 1994.
6In the analysis that follows income per capita will be used instead of consumption per capita. Income is a better
measure of idiosyncratic shocks and because it excludes transfers, it better captures the insurance function of food
aid.
7The shaded areas only represent the round which the village received free aid, for example, Haresaw suffered a
drought in 1994 which effected crop production in 1994 and 1995, while there was no free aid reported in the village,
there was a food-for-work program in the village.
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donor organization) channels aid through agents (village representatives in PAs) and
has some imperfect monitoring technology which determines the agent’s payoffs.
Suppose that ∆̄ is the total of aid alloted to a village. This value may have
been determined by assessments made by the principal, or requests sent in by village
representatives. Given this total amount of aid to the village, suppose ∆∗i is the
optimal allocation of aid to household i and ∆i is the actual transfer of aid to this
household. We use A∗i and Ai as indicator variables for strictly positive values of ∆
∗
i
and ∆i respectively. We use δi and ai to denote the difference between actual and
optimal values for these two set of variables.
If household utility is increasing and concave in income, and fully captures its
need for food aid, the first best allocation with a utilitarian planner, ∆(y) would be
linear in y and all households below some threshold level ȳ(∆̄) would be brought up
to that level and no households above that threshold would receive aid. The principal
cannot however observe food needs and is therefore not capable of implementing this
allocation. This is left to the agent and the agent’s actions are imperfectly monitored.
Monitoring can take place through random audits [Allingham and Sandmo, 1972],
a system of checks and balances, or through a village level appeals system where
village members are able to voice concern over aid allocations [TGE, 1993]. We do
not explicitly model the monitoring process. We simply assume that some form
of imperfect monitoring occurs at the village level and that the expected penalty
associated with misallocating aid depends both on the extent to which the set of
recipients deviates from the optimal set and the deviations of aid amounts. These
are put in as separate arguments to allow for the plausible case when the principal
can observe the values of ai’s more easily than the δi’s.
The agent, on his part, would like to distribute aid to maximize what we call his
10
influence, I(y, δ, p). The value of influence from allocating aid to a household captures
the ability of the household to make reciprocal transfers to the agent. We assume
that such influence is non-decreasing in household income, yi, the transfer of aid
above its optimal value, δi, and household power, pi. In addition Iyδ > 0 and Ipδ > 0
so agents would prefer to over allocate aid to households that are rich or powerful.
Total influence is given by
∑
i
I(yi, δi, pi). This specification is not meant to suggest
that agents are not altruistic or driven by any other considerations, it is simply meant
to capture the forces that may cause actual allocations to systematically deviate from
optimal ones. How important these forces are is an empirical question which we will
turn to below.
To summarize, we suppose that the penalty function is given by
∑
i
F (a2i , δ
2
i ) and




[I(yi, δi, pi)− F (a2i , δ2i )]




The agent equalizes the net gain from allocating aid across households. For any
two agents i and j, the first order conditions to the above problem require that for
any two households i and j in the village, Iδi − Fδi = Iδj − Fδj .
The nature of this allocation will depend on the joint distribution of household
characteristics in the village. It is easy to see however why agents might limit dis-
tortions in the ai’s and make them instead in the δi’s. If, for example, the penalty





i ), the agent will set all ai’s equal to zero by allo-
cating small amounts of aid to all deserving households. Controlling for the level of
income, we would expect to find households with more power receiving more than
11
their optimal allocation. The relationship between income and aid is less clear be-
cause, although richer households are more capable of making reciprocal transfers
to the agent, income is more easily verifiable ex-post and so the penalties associated
with transfers to richer households are also higher.
2.4 Data
We will test how effective community-level targeting has been in rural Ethiopia
in targeting income and whether variables which capture power or influence in the
village will have an impact on the probability of receiving aid or the amount of aid
receive. Recall that there were two arguments put forth above about how to interpret
the insignificant role of income in determining aid allocations: (1) there was a desire
to be equitable in aid allocations or (2) the lack of accountability to the poor resulted
in errors of exclusion and errors of inclusion.8 The predictions of the model suggest
that if the lack of correlation between income and aid is due to the latter argument
then variables which capture influence or power should be positive and significant
and if monitoring costs differ across the two stages of targeting then power would
be most significant in determining aid allocations conditional on being selected to
receive aid since it is easier to manipulate how much aid a household receives than
who receives aid. The former argument implies that power or influence should have
no impact on aid allocations at either stage. In order to test this, data comes from the
Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) covering six rounds of data between the
years 1994 to 2004. The survey was administered by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with the department of economics at
Addis Ababa University (AAU) and the Center for the Study of African Economies
8We also discussed Clay et al.’s (1999) findings that a significant number of food secure female headed and elderly
headed households received aid. While these are examples of errors of inclusion they are not necessarily examples of
being unaccountable to the poor. We investigate the role of gender and age in the empirical section.
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(CSAE) at Oxford University.
The initial survey conducted in 1989 surveyed seven villages to study the response
of households to food crises. At the time of the survey, there were no intentions of
creating a longitudinal data set. The 450 households within the seven peasant asso-
ciations were randomly selected while the villages located in the regions of Amahara,
Oromiya, and SNNPR, in southern and central Ethiopia, were primarily ones that
suffered from the 1984-1985 famine and other droughts that followed between 1987
and 1989. In 1994, CSAE and AAU conducted a panel survey incorporating six
of the seven villages surveyed in 1989, plus an additional nine villages to give ap-
proximately 1500 households surveyed. The villages were chosen to account for the
diversity among the major farming systems. The attrition rate from 1989-1994 in
the six villages used in the 1989 survey was less than 7 percent. The lost households
were replaced by households which were considered by village elders and officials as
being similar to, in demographic and wealth terms, as the households which could
not be traced. Households formed out of households interviewed in 1989 were also
interviewed, usually sons or daughters who after marriage formed their own house-
hold. The large number of randomly selected households within each village allows
us to investigate within village aid allocations.
In this paper we use all six rounds from 1994 to 2004 which contain approximately
1400 households surveyed from fifteen peasant associations. Round 2 and 3 took place
in 1995 approximately 4-8 months apart, so to ensure comparability to the other
rounds, round 2 and 3 were combined in order to capture the main cropping seasons
for the entire year. This leaves us with five rounds of data, with data covering the
years 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2004. Of the fifteen peasant associations surveyed,
eleven peasant associations received aid in at least one round. Between fifteen and
13
forty-two percent of our sample received aid in a given round, with as much as one
hundred percent coverage in the village of Korodegaga in round two to as little as
eleven percent coverage in the village of Adele Keke. Table 3 gives the spatial and
temporal coverage for each of the villages in our analysis.
In determining the probability of receiving aid, we use all households in the villages
which received aid, while in determining the amount of aid received we restrict our
analysis to only households which received aid in any of the surveyed rounds. This
sampling framework allows us to take advantage of the panel data to investigate the
decision rule for why some households receive aid in one round and not in another.
The ERHS collected information on household consumption, household income,
household assets, and household demographics. The ERHS has detailed information
on whether the household received aid, how much aid the household received, the
source from whom the aid was received and whether the aid was given in-kind or
in-cash. All gifts from the government or non-government organizations received by
the household and reported as food aid or a donation9 makes up our measure of free
distribution.10 Most aid is received in-kind and comes in the form of wheat, maize,
sorghum and cooking oil. To convert aid into cash equivalents, the amounts were
first converted to kilograms and then converted to cash equivalents using local village
prices.
Developing a measure of need is difficult and has been highly debated, income
has been used in previous studies as a measure of need to test how well aid has been
targeted [Jayne et al., 2002, Clay et al., 1999] and most studies have found that there
9 Food aid refers to free aid not food for work.
10 Gifts were reported at the individual level, the sum of each individual household member’s aid receipts make up
the household level food aid receipts. The analysis could have been done at the individual level but aid is allocated
based off of the household head characteristics. From qualitative studies [Sharp, 1997] only the household head is
eligible to receive aid and can only designate another household member to pick up the aid only when the head is
unable to.
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is little to no relationship between income and aid. The problem with interpreting
the coefficient on income is that income may be endogenous, if food aid has positive
health effects which may effect labor productivity or if food aid has disincentive
effects. The former will lead to a positive bias in the estimate of the coefficient on
income while the latter will lead to a negative bias in the estimate of the coefficient
on income. There may also be random measurement error in the reporting of income
which will result in attenuation bias. The net effect of these three sources of bias is
ambiguous. Finding suitable instruments to deal with the endogeneity problem has
proven to be challenging in that most suitable instruments may be used by the village
representatives in targeting households, and it is unclear whether or not to include
them in the regressions or to use them as instruments. We instrument for income
with land holdings and livestock ownership, which will be discussed in more detail
below. Income equals the sum of crop production, converted to cash equivalents
using village level prices, income from self-employment activities, and income from
wage labor.11 Income and aid were converted to cash equivalents using village level
prices and average monthly values used.
We argue that the more power a household has within the village, the higher
the incentive the agent has in allocating aid to them. One of the key variables of
interest, is whether or not the household head has power in the village. The round
6 survey included a module to address social interactions within the village. One of
the questions ask the household head to rank how much power he has on a scale from
one to nine, where one represents no power and nine represents the most power. We
assume that power is normally distributed and computed an index of power that runs
11Income from crop production had an one year recall period (surveyed asked about the two primary agricultural
seasons) and was divided by 12 to get monthly values, self-employment income and wage-labor income had a four
month recall period and was divided by 4 to get monthly values.
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from zero to one, which represents a household’s percentile ranking of power.12 We
use power to capture any influence or power the household may have in the village,
that may induce the village representatives to allocate aid to these households.
There may be concern that our measure of power is just a proxy for wealth, highly
correlated with income and assets, and that the coefficient on power is not providing
any additional information. Appendix A lists the top five responses household heads
gave when asked what made a household powerful. The number one response was
someone who is an elder, two of the top responses dealt with political connections
and the other two of the top responses had to do with individual characteristics. We
offer this as support that our power measure captures additional information not
captured by income and assets. Because our measure of power is only available in
one round, we do not know explicitly how power varies over time. We argue that
since our power variable is positively correlated with all measures of wealth and our
measures of wealth are correlated over time, power is time-invariant. Further, what
constitutes power within villages: political connections, personality traits, etc., are
not likely to vary much over time (in particular, over the ten year span they were
surveyed). Additional control variables include household size, age of the household
head, gender of the household head, and the fraction of children and elderly in the
household.
2.5 Empirical specification
In this section, we examine the agent’s allocation rule used for free distribution
food aid. First, the agent decides who is eligible for food aid and then decides how
much aid to allocate to each household.
12We first take the fraction of households within each ranking and then compute the z-score from a cumulative
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one. We then calculate the households expected z-score given
their response in order to obtain the households ranking of power.
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(2.2) yi1 = 1[xiδ1 + vi > 0]
(2.3) yi2 = xiβ1 + ui
where yi1 is the binary free distribution participation indicator, yi2 ≡ log(aid), and
xi are household characteristics for household i. We argue that the same variables
go into the decision for whether or not a household will receive aid and how much
aid a household should receive once selected to receive aid, but the coefficients on
each variable may be different across the two regressions.13 Jayne et al. (2002)
run the regressions above using data on a large number of nationally representative
sampled households collected in 1996. The large number of districts available to
Jayne et al. (2002) allows them to analyze the allocation rule across districts but
because of the small number of households available within each district, prevents
them from adequately investigating allocations across households. We follow the
analysis provided by Dercon and Krishnan (2003) who use the first three rounds of
the ERHS. Like Dercon and Krishnan (2003) we are able to investigate the role of
time-varying and time-invariant information and investigate the possibility of the
omitted variables problem. We add to Dercon and Krishnan’s (2003) analysis by
investigating the role power has in determining who receives aid and how much aid
a household received. The model we want to estimate,
(2.4) yit1 = 1[xitδ1 + ci + vit > 0]
13A tobit model would restrict the coefficients to be the same across the two models.
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(2.5) yit2 = xitβ1 + ci + uit
where now we introduce time, t, and the presence of time-invariant variables that
may or may not be observable to us, ci. The time-varying observable household
characteristics include household income, gender of the household head, age of the
household head, household size, and the fraction of children and elderly household
members. Power is included as a time-invariant variable.
2.5.1 Income and Endogeneity
We discussed earlier about the endogeneity of income and the difficulty in ob-
taining suitable instruments. The purpose of our regressions is to account for all
information used by the village representatives in determining who is eligible for aid
and how much aid each household should receive. To account for the endogeneity
of income we instrument for income using land and livestock holdings. Jayne et al.
(2002) use land and livestock ownership in their regressions as extra explanatory
variables. Under their specification the coefficient on income uses the variation in
income which is uncorrelated with land and livestock to explain aid allocations. This
specification also makes it hard to interpret the coefficient on income because of the
reasons described above. The specification we use with land and livestock as instru-
ments for income allow us to account for the endogeneity of income. Under this
specification, the coefficient on income uses the variation in income which is corre-
lated with land and livestock and captures the extent of wealth targeting. Observed
income can be broken down into two parts, permanent income and transitory income.
Including land and livestock in the regression allows us to estimate the response of
aid to transitory shocks, unfortunately we believe that if endogeneity exists, it is due
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to the transitory part of income. Using permanent income as our measure of income
should remedy the endogeneity problem.
Let the univariate regression be given by:
(2.6) y = β0 + β1x + ε
and the auxiliary regression given by:
(2.7) x = γ0 + γ1z + v
with v and ε correlated and z and ε uncorrelated. x̂ = γ0 + γ1z is maximally
correlated with z, while the second, v, is orthogonal to z. When instrumenting with
z the estimate of β comes from x̂. When including z in regression (2.6) the estimate of
β comes from v. As long as land holdings and livestock ownership is exogenous then
when using land and livestock as instruments, the variation in x is exogenous.14 Our
measure of land holdings comes from the first round survey in 199415 and livestock
ownership is measured using an index for livestock ownership.
2.6 Results
In this section we present regressions describing the allocation of food aid to
households. A number of specifications are tested to explore the role income plays in
targeting.16 We first present results from our probit regression. By including village
fixed-effects we can only use villages with partial coverage, the probit estimates report
the probability of receiving aid conditional on the village receiving aid. Second we
14For a more thorough discussion of instrumental variables refer to Wooldridge (2002)
15Unlike many countries there is very little land disparities in Ethiopia. During the land reforms that took place
in 1975, land became owned by the government and was redistributed based on household size so that within villages
there is very little land inequalities. Due to the government owning all land and the restrictions on the sale, the
renting, and the leasing of land, there is very little activity in the land market. Because we believe that much of the
temporal variation we are picking up in landholdings is due to measurement error we use only initial landholdings.
16We discussed earlier that there are no criteria that the Peasant Associations are required to follow in the selection
of household beneficiaries. While it appears that in the villages used in our sample, the decision process is similar
across the villages, we must first ensure that the behavioral equation we wish to estimate has the same parameters
across villages. A chow test for poolability gives an observed F-statistic of .40. We fail to reject the hypothesis of
poolability.
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present results from a pooled Tobit regression17, using only households which received
aid in any of the surveyed rounds. The Tobit estimates report the amount of aid
received, conditional on being selected for free aid. The Probit and Tobit regressions
include village fixed-effects and time-varying village fixed-effects.
Because we believe income to be endogenous we use land and livestock ownership
as identifying instruments. Table 4 present the first stage regression including all
exogenous variables. Land and livestock holdings are positively correlated with in-
come as expected. Increasing land holdings by one hectare increases income by 7.4
percent holding everything else constant, while an increase in a households livestock
holdings index by one increases income by slightly more at 8.3 percent. All additional
variables have the expected sign, the more power a household has the more income
the household has. Female-headed households have lower income than male headed
households. The more dependents in the household, as measured by the fraction of
children and elderly in the household, and the larger the household size, the poorer
the household. The reported F-statistic from the test that both of the coefficients
on land or livestock is zero is 39.52.
2.6.1 Determinants of Food Aid Allocations: The Probability of Receiving Aid
Table 5 present probit and ivprobit results for the probability of receiving aid
using the pooled data, with robust standard errors corrected for village-cluster effects.
The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes on the value of one if the
household received aid and zero if the household did not receive aid. Only villages
with partial food aid coverage are used in the probit regression. We run a number
of specifications to investigate the role income plays in how aid is allocated.
Column (1) reflects the extent of income targeting. Income is negative and sig-
17An F-test for the significance of household effects, yields an F-value of 0.84. We fail to reject the null hypothesis
of zero household effects.
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nificant at the ten percent level. This suggests that village representatives use their
informational advantage to target poorer households.
Clay et al. (1999) found income to be insignificant which they attributed to a
disproportionate number of female and elderly headed households receiving aid re-
gardless of need. Column (2) investigates the role gender and age of the household
head plays in aid targeting. Consistent with Clay et al.’s (1999) findings, income
loses its significance and female and older household heads have a higher probability
of receiving aid. The inclusion of additional control variables in the probit estimates
do not change the results much, income remains insignificant, female and age are
statistically positive and significant, and household size enters with a negative coef-
ficient which is marginally significant. Power and the number of dependents do not
affect the probability of receiving aid (columns (3) and (4)).
Columns (5)-(8) present the IV estimates using land and livestock holdings as
identifying instruments. The IV estimates tell a slightly different story. The IV esti-
mates of income are larger in magnitude than the probit estimates and significantly
negative. The larger coefficient on income suggests that income may be measured
with error or endogenous. Once we instrument for income to account for the endo-
geneity problem, gender and age of the household head no longer become significant.
Disparities in wealth account for the large fraction of female and elderly headed
households receiving aid. In the probit, without accounting for the endogeneity of
income, gender and age of the household head are picking up the part of income
that is endogenous which would be what one would expect if the female and elderly
headed households are more vulnerable to shocks.
Adding additional controls, the estimates on income fall in magnitude but remain
significant at the ten percent level. Power and the fraction of dependent household
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members remain insignificant while household size remains negative and significant.
The results with all controls and both village and time-varying village effects provide
strong support that the informational advantage that village representatives have
do play a role in targeting needy households, evaluated at the mean of all other
variables, households at the 25th percentile of log per capita income have an average
probability of 60 percent of receiving aid, at the 75th percentile this probability falls
to 32 percent. These effects are significantly larger than in Jayne et al. (2002). As
mentioned above Jayne et al.’s (2002) within district sample was significantly smaller
than ours which makes comparison with their results difficult.18
2.6.2 Determinants of Food Aid Allocations: Aid Disbursements
Table 6 presents the Tobit and IVTobit results for households which received aid
over the ten year period. Each regression includes village fixed effects and time-
varying village effects, with robust stand errors corrected for village-cluster effects.
The dependent variable is the log of monthly aid receipts.
Consistent with previous author’s findings income is insignificant. This finding
could suggest that village representatives do not use their informational advantage
in allocating aid to aid recipients. This finding is robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional controls. On the other hand, while income does not appear to be targeted in
determine how much aid a household should receive, other household demographics
do appear to be targeted. The older the household head the more aid the household
receives, an increase in the age of the household head by one year, holding gender,
income and household composition constant, increases the amount of aid the house-
hold receives by 1.2 percent. The larger the fraction of household members above
the age of 55, the less aid the household receives. For a family of five, going from
18The results from a Random Effects Probit model were almost identical in sign and significance.
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2 household members above the age of 55, to three household members above the
age of 55, decreases the amount of aid the household receives by approximately 10
percent. The larger the fraction of household members below the age of 15, however,
increases the amount of aid the household receives. Going from 2 to 3 household
members below the age of 15 for a family of five, increases aid receipts by approxi-
mately 5 percent. These results could be due to different nutritional needs or food
requirements by age. The IV estimates are almost identical to the pooled OLS esti-
mates, which suggests that wealth is not used by village representatives to determine
household allocations.
The model we presented above argued that there is an incentive to target wealthier
and more powerful households. The results thus far have suggested that wealth is
only used in determining aid recipients but not aid allocations. There are a number
of stories that can explain these findings. One is that put forth by Sharp (1997),
that there is a desire to allocate aid equally among all aid recipients, another, is that
it is more costly and difficult to monitor how much aid a household receives than
who receives aid. Strong support for the second claim would be found if we had a
statistically positive coefficient on income, the wealthier aid recipients receive more
aid. Another way to distinguish between the two scenarios is by determining the
role power plays in aid allocations. If there is a desire to allocate aid equally, then
power should be insignificant, on the other hand, if power is significant, then there is
evidence against the egalitarian argument. The significant and positive coefficient on
power fails to support the hypothesis that there is a desire for equal allocations across
households, but supports the hypothesis that agents either have an incentive to target
more powerful, influential households (conditional on them being aid recipients) or
that powerful households are able to influence aid allocations. A ten percentage
23
point change in power increases the amount of aid a household receives by almost 2
percent.
2.7 Conclusion
The effectiveness of public assistance programs depends crucially on how well the
programs identify vulnerable and needy individuals in times of assistance and most
importantly in times of crises. When there are information asymmetries community-
based programs are favored and rightfully so because of there ability to surpass
informational barriers. However little is known about how effective community-level
targeting is at using its informational advantage to identify intended beneficiaries.
This paper investigated the type of information used to determine food aid re-
ceipts. The existing literature on food aid in Ethiopia shows no systematic rela-
tionship between food aid and pre-aid income. We found, in contrast, that income
appeared to be used to select aid beneficiaries, however, income was not used to de-
termine aid allocations. We provided evidence that the insignificant role of income
as a discriminating factor for aid allocations was not due entirely by a tendency of
village representatives to equally distribute aid. We showed that power does matter
and that households which possessed more power, received more aid. This finding is
of importance because many public programs, in particular food aid programs, are
intended to reach the vulnerable and marginalized population, the population with
the least amount of power.
These findings are consistent when implementing a program where there are differ-
ential costs in monitoring the behavior of agents, it is easier to identify who receives
aid, but it becomes more difficult to identify how much aid each household received.
Our findings show that agency problems may be important and that agents are more
24
likely to distort the distribution of aid receipts than the set of aid recipients. Our
study also suggests that informal structures of power within African villages can







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: First Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Income
coeff. Std. Err.
Power 0.142∗ 0.076
Female head -0.339∗∗∗ 0.051
age of household head -0.002 0.002
Livestock units 0.083∗∗∗ 0.011
household size -0.099∗∗∗ 0.012
Fraction Elder -0.467∗∗∗ 0.152
Fraction Children -0.455∗∗∗ 0.120
Initial Land Holdings 0.074∗∗∗ 0.020
Constant 3.646∗∗∗ 0.170
Village Dummies Yes









Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Top Five Criteria for the Allocation of Aid
Village Members
1 Old people
2 Quota for the village








5 Households with no support
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Responses come from round 6, household heads were asked ”How was free food allocated in this community?” and
village representatives, which consisted of community leaders, peasant association chairmen, elders, etc., were asked ”What
are the criteria by which free food is allocated to members of this PA?”
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Top Five Reasons for being Powerful
Powerful Households
1 Elder.
2 Personal organizational ability.
3 Peasant Association Committee.
4 Political Connections (Strong Man).
5 Personal charisma.
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Responses come from round 3, household heads were first asked to identify the most powerful individuals in the
village and then asked ”The reason for being power?”.
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Data Description: Variables Used in the Analysis
Key Variables of Interest
lninc Household income per capita (Excludes public and private transfers).
AID Total household free food Aid.
POWER Households percentile ranking of power given respondents perceived power within the
village (See Ladder).
Additional Control Variables
LADDER ”Please imagine a nine-step ladder, where on the bottom, the first step, stand people
who are completely without rights, and step 9, the highest step, stand those who have a lot
of power. On which step are you?”
LSU Household livestock unit.
FEMALE Dummy variable 1 if head of the household is female, and 0 otherwise.
AGEHD Age of household head.
HHSIZE Household size.
FRAC CHLD Fraction of household members below the age of 15.
FRAC OLD Fraction of household members above the age of 55.
LAND94 Household land holdings in 1994.
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Food Aid and Adult Nutrition
3.1 Introduction
The role of food aid has played an important role in Ethiopia, and many developing
countries, for disaster relief, development, and as a means to reduce vulnerability to
agricultural shocks. The literature on food aid primarily falls into three categories:
1.) targeting, 2.) incentive effects, and 3.) health effects. The literature on targeting
began to increase in the nineties as the availability of world food aid began to decline
and concern about how well intended beneficiaries were benefiting from aid programs
began to increase.1 The literature on the dependency problems associated with aid
and the incentive effects of transfers on labor supply and productivity has always
been of interest to researchers and continues to be as improvements in data quality
and availability increase from developing countries.
This paper departs from the literature on targeting and incentives and focuses
on the effects of food aid on individual adult nutritional status, as measured by
Quetelet’s body mass index (BMI). Whereas many studies have looked at the nutri-
1 A number of papers have focused on how well aid is targeted across areas and across households within the
same area and which targeting mechanisms are most effective in identifying needy households (administrative versus
community level targeting) (Barret (2001), Shapouri and Missiaen (1990), Zahariadis et al. (2000), Jayne et al.
(2002), Clay et al. (1999) Dercon and Krishnan (2003)). There has been mixed reviews on how well aid has
been targeted in Rural Ethiopia, previous studies have suggested that there are strong regional biases in targeting
uncorrelated with need (Jayne et al. (2002) and Clay et al. (1999)) while household targeting was found to be
marginally better than a random allocation of aid across households (Clay et al. (1999) and Dercon and Krishnan
(2003)). Other papers on household targeting in Rural Ethiopia suggest that most of the targeting takes place in
identifying needy households but not in distinguishing differing amounts of aid across aid recipients (Sharp (1994)).
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tional status of children, very few studies have focused attention on the nutritional
status of adults in developing countries with the exception being the theoretical
models of nutritional-based efficiency wages.2 These models set up the framework
for understanding the importance of nutrition in poor countries because poor nutri-
tion among potential labor market participants can lead to poverty traps if energy
deficiency prevent them from participating in the labor market. In short, the struc-
ture of individual productivity in extremely poor areas, whether it is on one’s own
plot of land or in wage labor, heavily depends on an individual’s health. Understand-
ing the role that safety nets play in adult nutrition is an important contribution to
understanding the dynamics of poverty in developing countries.
Public transfers to individuals of the household can be viewed as positive shocks
and shared across household members. How aid is distributed within the household
has received very little attention, but it is important to know if aid improves nu-
tritional status and which household members benefit most from aid receipts. This
is important because if aid does indeed improve nutrition then aid may also have
an impact on productivity through a nutrition-productivity link (Dasgupta (1993)).
In these models the relationship between nutrition and work capacity is character-
ized by a nonlinear relationship with work capacity a convex function of nutrition
at low levels of nutrition to take into account the fact that the body requires a cer-
tain minimal amount of nutrition before productivity gains begin to kick in. This
relationship between nutrition and work capacity has been used to explain inequal-
ity and unemployment in poor countries but also to explain unequal distributions
within the household,3 where it may be more efficient to allocate more resources to
2For a more detailed analysis see Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz (1976) and Dasgupta and Ray (1986).
3These models ignore bargaining power; women with more bargaining power may demand more resources to
ensure their minimal requirements are met so that they can be productive in their own activities. See Chiappori
(1992);Bourguignon et al. (1993); Browning et al. (1994).
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individuals who have higher market returns to nutrition. The link between nutrition
and productivity highlights the tradeoff between efficiency and equity. On one hand,
if resources to the household are insufficient for an acceptable standard of living
unequal division of resources may exist beyond the basic fundamental differences
in minimal requirements in nutrition, care, and economic resources as households
allocate resources to individuals with the highest returns.4 On the other hand, if
there is a desire for equal distributions of resources then if resources are insufficient
to ensure that individuals are healthy enough to be productive in the labor market,
the resulting outcome will be a cycle of poverty.5
Current adult nutritional status depends on past investments in health, require-
ments for maintenance of the body, current physical activities and energy expendi-
tures, and health endowments. While the effects of public transfers on adult nutrition
is an important question, empirical testing can be complex due to heterogeneity in
energy expenditure, health endowments and nutrient requirements, many of which
are unobserved to the econometrician. In much of the literature on nutritional status,
energy expenditures have been ignored while health endowments have been assumed
the same across household members. Not controlling for individual heterogeneity
may bias regression results. Using a rich panel dataset, this paper runs individual
fixed effects regressions to eliminate time-invariant individual effects such as health
endowments and attempts to proxy for energy expenditures and nutrient require-
ments with some limitations.
Food aid can play an important role in buffering the effects of adverse shocks
in poor, liquidity constrained households. Public assistance primarily comes during
4This is known as the lifeboat problem: poor households who are liquidity constrained may have to allocated
scarce resources to individuals in the household who may be most productive.
5The tendency to equally distribute aid receipts among aid recipients has been one argument for the apparent
ineffectiveness aid in many poor African villages.
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times of aggregate shocks such as droughts and most village households become eli-
gible for assistance.6 The impact aid has on adult household members is important
because these are the members who insure the survival of the household through a
number of labor intensive activities (both men and women). This paper looks at
a sub-group of the household, namely adult men and women between the ages of
17 and 55, and investigates the effects that food aid has on adult nutrition. With-
out knowing individual consumption of aid it is impossible to access intra-household
allocations directly but this paper attempts to infer distributional impacts by con-
trolling for individual heterogeneity. For credit constrained poor households, equal
distributions or distributions to non-productive household members may not be fea-
sible [Stiglitz, 1976] and therefore the bulk of public assistances must flow to male or
healthier household members. On the other hand, additional household resources,
such as food aid, may flow to the least healthiest members or to members with little
bargaining power. While the data does not allow for inference about how much aid is
received by individuals within the household the results do allow inference about the
relative impact the presence of aid resources within the household has on different
household members. I use panel data from rural Ethiopia on individual nutritional
status to first test whether there is an effect of public transfers on nutritional levels
for adults and secondly to test whether the effect differs depending on the gender of
the recipient and/or the gender of the individual.
3.1.1 Public Transfers in Ethiopia
Public transfers in Ethiopia primarily come in two forms, free distribution (FD)
and food-for-work (FFW). FD is targeted towards needy households with no work
6This is particular true in the villages surveyed in the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey where many of the
villages were selected because of the impact the 1984-1985 famine had on them and still adversely suffer from the
famine and droughts that followed.
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requirements whereas participants in FFW programs work on community develop-
ment projects in return for a wage in the form of food. The Ethiopian government is
committed to ensuring that no able-bodied person should receive food aid without
working on a community project in return whereas FD should be targeted to house-
holds which do not have a person who can work. 80% of all food assistance programs
are FFW.
In this paper I focus exclusively on aid that comes in the form of FD. Looking at
FD as opposed to FFW is beneficial for a number of reasons.7 First, because FFW
has work requirements it is unclear how FFW will impact adult nutrition since as
additional energy is being provided from the food, additional energy is being burned
in the form of work requirements or as other household members take on additional
tasks as the FFW participant works outside of the household. Secondly, unlike FFW,
FD can be viewed as unearned income and shared among all household members.
This second reason is crucial for the analysis in this paper. FD is administered
based on household characteristics and is only distributed to the household head,8 a
single individual does not have claim to FD. FFW, on the other hand, depends on
household and individual characteristics. The individual must be able to work and
must be able to travel to the FFW site. FFW can be seen as individual wages.9
Although the precise mechanism for the allocation of food aid in Ethiopia remains
unclear, official documents suggest that there are at least two levels at which food
needs are assessed, the Wereda or district level and the household level. Members
representing the government, international donors, and non-government organiza-
7The selection into FFW vs. FD is not of concern here because no village received both FFW and FD in the
same round except for one village. The results do not change with the exclusion of this village.
8In some circumstances aid can be received by someone other than the household head if the head is unable to
make it to the distribution center. In less than 10 cases more than one household member received aid.
9Quisumbing ( 2003) present the case that FFW can be seen as a factor that effects the individuals relative
desirability of being outside of the outside. Since opportunities for women are rare in rural Ethiopia, gender-specific
targeting in FFW programs can increase women’s options outside of marriage.
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tions conduct Wereda level assessments while representatives within villages identify
needy households. Selection for aid receipts depend on household characteristics and
is administered to the household head. Approximately 80% of the aid recipients were
household heads and in the remaining households, aid was received primarily by the
head’s spouse or child and in almost every case the head was elderly or disabled.
Anthropological studies for Ethiopia show that community members do have knowl-
edge of the needs of different families (Sharp 1997), but the effectiveness with which
they use this information has been debated and criticized. Many studies have found
that selection into public assistance programs heavily depends on household income,
with the likelihood of receiving aid decreasing the higher the household income is.
On the other hand, income has been shown to play little or no role in determining
how much aid recipients receive. To deal with the issue of selection into aid programs
the sample consist only of households which received aid. An earlier study showed
that unobservable variables correlated with wealth and power helped determine how
much aid a household received. This can cause a problem with the analysis if these
unobservables are correlated with health status. Consistent estimates are feasible
by using fixed effects and controlling for time-varying covariates that determine aid
allocations.
3.1.2 Nutrition and Productivity
There is growing interest in the relationship between health and labor market out-
comes. There is a general consensus that there exist a positive relationship between
health and income but drawing causal interpretations are met with a number of
econometric issues.10 The relationship between nutrition and income can be used to
argue the continued role of aid programs in poor villages. In order to assess the role
10Refer to Strauss and Thomas (1998) for a review of the literature
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of aid on nutrition there must first be an acceptable measure of nutritional status.
The Quetelet body mass index (BMI) is a measure widely used to define nutritional
status of adults. It is measured as weight in kilograms divided by squared height in
meters. The Quetelet index has been proposed as an objective measure of chronic
energy deficiency in adults.11 Which cutoffs classifies individuals as malnourished
has not been completely established but what is clear is that individuals with low
Quetelet indexes are associated with decreases in work output and the inability to
sustain productivity for an extended period of time. The Quetelet index has been
shown to fluctuate over short horizons due to seasonal fluctuations and shocks that
may effect food consumption, and there is a general consensus that large fluctuations
over a short time frame are detrimental. The Quetelet index is an objective mea-
sure of adult nutrition and is believed to be highly correlated with individual food
consumption.
Figures 1 through 9 show estimates of the distribution of adult BMI. Each graph
shows the estimated density functions of BMI by round for the total sample, low-
asset households, high-asset households and for men and women. Modal BMI is the
same for both males and females and for low and high-asset households at an index
of 20. Females tend to have a higher variance of BMI for each sub-group.
In this paper I use panel data on 259 households and 547 adult men and women
from the first three rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household survey. The Quetelet
index is used as a measure of adult nutritional status in order for me to test the
effects of food aid. The use of the Quetelet index in this paper has a number of
advantages: it is easy to obtain; it does not suffer from measurement error the way
other measures of nutrition are; it is closely related to individual’s food consumption
11 Chronic energy deficiency is defined as a ”steady state” where an individual is in energy balance despite the
low body weight and low body energy stores. Refer to Shetty and James’ ”Body Mass Index-A Measure of Chronic
Energy Deficiency in Adults.”
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levels; and it is available at the individual level. The rest of the paper is as follows.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical specification followed
by section 4 which discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
Data comes from the first three rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
(ERHS) which interviewed 1,477 households three times between 1994 and 1995. The
survey was administered by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
in collaboration with the department of economics at Addis Ababa University (AAU)
and the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University.
The survey provides health, individual characteristics, income earned from a num-
ber of work-related activities and private or public transfers on over 9,000 adults and
children. Information on consumption and assets are available at the household level.
The analysis is restricted to 7 of the 15 sampled villages due to the fact that these
were the only villages which received FD during the 1994-1995 survey rounds. From
the 7 villages which received FD only households which received aid were used in the
analysis, 388 of the 549 households received aid in at least one of the survey rounds.
Of the 1065 adult individuals in the 388 households only 687 adults between the
ages of 17 and 55 had complete information over the three rounds. Only households
which had complete information on at least one male and one female were used in
the analysis to avoid drawing conclusions on households with adults of only one sex,
this left a final sample size of 285 women and 262 men across 259 households.
This paper is interested in the effects that food aid has on adult nutrition and
whether the gender of the aid recipient plays a role in how aid is distributed. As
mentioned earlier, aid is primarily administered to the head of the household, and
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comparison across gender recipients could be misleading if female headed households
are different from male headed households.12 70 percent of female headed households
are either widowed or still married. Female heads who are still married have a hus-
band who is present in the household but is disabled or husband who has temporarily
migrated for work. Widowed households can be viewed as households who are no
different than male headed households but who received an unforeseen shock (the
death of the male head), whereas married households whose husband is either absent
or disabled are similar to other households with fewer male labor.13 Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for the sampled households. 20 percent of the household sample
are female headed households and approximately 20 percent of aid recipients were
female but they did not all come from female headed households. In fact, table 1
shows that 50 percent of female recipients came from male headed households. The
characteristics of households where there is a male recipient or a female recipient are
very similar across the three rounds of data.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 replicates the tables from Dercon and Krishnan (2000) and
presents a summary of individual BMI scores across rural Ethiopia for the sample
across the three rounds and seven villages. Mean levels of BMI are between 19 and 20
which is typical in other rural areas in developing countries except for Imdibir whose
mean index is as low as 16.51 for men. We are interested in how food aid buffers
fluctuations in the Quetelet index. Table 2 presents the average of the minimum
Quetelet index as a percentage of the maximum Quetelet index for each village for
1220 percent of the sampled households are female headed. This is not an oversample of female headed households,
of the full sample of households surveyed in the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) 20 percent were female
headed.
13The fraction of married female headed households used in the analysis is slightly higher than the full sample of
the ERHS, 30 percent compared to 20 percent, while the sample of divorced female headed households used in the
analysis is slightly smaller than the full sample of the ERHS, 20 percent compared to 30 percent. Because the sample
used in the analysis consists of aid recipient households it is natural to assume that village resources may flow to
households which have important household members temporarily missing. For female headed households who are
divorced village resources are less likely to flow to households if divorce is looked down on.
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men and women. Table 2 suggests a significant amount of variability in the Quetelet
index across all villages. The lowest level of the index as a percentage of the highest
level is 85.98 for women and 87.02 for men. These results suggest a weight loss of
13−14 percent over a 18 month period! These measures are lower than the measures
reported in Dercon and Krishnan (2000), recall they used all 15 villages whereas the
villages used in this study were some of the poorest villages, so we expect there to
be a higher level of variability in nutritional status. Table 3 is of particular interest
because it relates the sample used in the analysis to chronic energy deficiency. Severe
malnutrition has been associated with decreased productivity. Similar to Dercon and
Krishnan (2000) about a quarter of the sample is malnourished, reporting a Quetelet
index below 18.5 with a significant proportion displaying a Quetelet index below 17.
Table 4 presents the contribution of food aid to monthly food consumption. In
the rounds a village receives aid, food aid contributes significantly to total household
food consumption. Food consumption in the form of aid is as high as 76 percent
in Kordegaga to as low as 1 percent in Imdibir. Table 4 demonstrates the role that
food aid can play in improving health. In this paper I will investigate the effects aid
has on adult nutrition in Rural Ethiopia.
3.3 Empirical Specification
To understand food aid’s indirect effect on productivity, an understanding of how
aid impacts health is important.
Health status in each period can be characterized by a health production func-
tion14 which depends on consumption, c, illness/disease, d, energy expenditure, e,
household and village fixed effects, and individual health endowment, u:
14See Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983)
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(3.1) Hit = H(cit, dit, eit, S, M, ui)
With Hc > 0, Hd < 0 and He < 0.
Consumption boosts nutrition, while illness/disease and energy expenditure de-
plete nutrition. S and M are household and village environment factors which effect
nutritional status. Consumption equals the sum of food consumption from agricul-
tural production or purchased with wage labor income, wit, and food aid, ait.
If the amount of aid allocated across households was randomly distributed and
individuals were identical, we could estimate the following equation by OLS:
(3.2) Hit = α0 + β1ait + β2wit + β3eit + ηit
For reasons described earlier aid is unlikely to be distributed randomly and in-
dividuals are not identical. If we knew all the factors effecting nutritional status in
period t and control for the household factors which effect aid allocations then we
can estimate:
(3.3) Hijvt = α0 + β1aijvt + β2wijvt + β3eijvt + β4sjtβ5mvt + ui + Sj + Mv + ηijvt
where sjt and mvt are time-varying household and village variables respectively
and Sj and Mv are time-invariant factors. Because ui may be correlated with the
other variables OLS will not give consistent estimates. For example, some household
individuals may not be as vulnerable to food and income shocks as others, if this is
known by the household then less aid will be allocated to those household members.
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Running individual fixed-effects regression drops the time-invariant variables so that
consistent estimates of β1 can be obtained.
The dependent variable is the natural log of the Quetelet index. Table 6 summa-
rizes the individual and household variables used in the regressions. One of the key
inputs for nutritional status is individual consumption of calories. The data does
not ask about individual calorie consumption and so is proxied by per capita calorie
food consumption logged, consumed one week prior to the survey and scaled to a
monthly value and logged per capita caloric aid receipts received since the previous
round (in the previous 4 months for round 1) and converted to a monthly value.
The survey asked each member of the household if they had to miss any days from
their main activity in the previous 4 weeks due to illness or injury and if so how
many days. The number of days missed due to illness or injury is used as a proxy for
illness. A dummy variable for whether the individual is pregnant or breastfeeding.
The survey does not have information about energy expenditure. Since mostly all the
households in the sample are farming households and most of their energy is spent
engaged in agricultural activities a proxy for energy expenditure is the number of
days the individual participated in a traditional labor sharing arrangement. A labor
sharing arrangement is when labor is shared across households. Variables controlling
for household composition include the number of household members which are male,
female, children and elderly. Additional control variables are age and age squared,
logged of non-food expenditure per capita and the log of household livestock value
per capita. Of particular interest is the effect that aid has on malnourished indi-
viduals (BMI below 18.5). A dummy variable was created to capture an individuals
vulnerability to malnutrition by taking on the value of 1 if the individual experienced
an episode of malnutrition during the three rounds.
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3.3.1 Limitations
While the fixed-effects regression removes the time-invariant variables which may
be correlated with the other covariates, they do not difference out unobservable time-
varying village factors that may affect aid distributions and nutritional status. Using
the previous example if seasons are characterized as peak and lean seasons, house-
holds may allocate fewer resources to household members who are less vulnerable
to food fluctuations during lean seasons. Due to the relatively short time frame in
between rounds individual adult nutrition may be vulnerable to season changes. To
deal with this concern the regressions include time-varying village effects, which will
capture village changes in between survey rounds (whether the survey was conducted
during a lean season or post harvest).
Another concern is that the effect of food aid on productivity can go either way
and because the data does not have acceptable data on productivity the coefficient
on aid can be biased upward or downward. If the presence of aid programs has
a negative impact on incentives then food aid can have negative consequences on
productivity.15 On the other hand, if food aid has positive effects on productivity, this
would come about through food aids impact on nutrition. The relationship between
aid and incentives can not be ignored if in fact aid has negative incentives effects.
For example, if total food consumption (consumption from agricultural production
plus food aid) does not change, but in times when food aid is present non-food
aid consumption goes down by as much as food aid consumption goes up, then to
infer a positive and significant coefficient on food aid (from changes in quality of
the same types of goods consumed, lower energy expenditure, etc.) as a positive
15In fact in one of the village studies which accompanied the survey, one respondent reported that the economic
condition was such that farmers were unable to ”sustain subsistence due to under-production” and attributed this
to the presence of free distribution and food-for-work programs. It was believed that farmers lacked the incentives
to invest in new technologies because of the village’s dependency on aid.
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impact on health would be incorrect. While I can not rule out food aid’s impact on
incentives (negative or positive), as mentioned earlier many of the sampled villages
have been recipients of aid since the famines of 1984 and 1985 and if there was any
impact on incentives, these impacts would not be characterized by short run changes.
Because the sampled periods cover approximately 18 months there is a strong case
that incentives are not changing and can be ignored.
3.4 Results
Table 7 − 10 reported fixed effects results for low and high asset households.
Low asset households are households whose livestock holdings are lower than the
village median livestock holdings. Regressions are run separately for low and high
asset households in case these household deal with shocks differently. Each table
has 6 regression results. Column 2 reports results for the full sample, column 3
replicates column 2 but interacts aid receipts with the dummy for whether or not
the individual ever experienced an episode of malnutrition. These regressions are
repeated in columns 4 and 5 for men and in columns 6 and 7 for women.
Table 7 and 8 reports the effects of aid on individual adult nutrition. For low asset
households, a ten percent increase in aid allocations increases adult nutrition by 0.04
percent for both men and women whereas for high asset households, a ten percent
increase in aid allocations increases adult nutrition by 0.023 percent which appears
to only effect men. For an individual with the average Quetelet index of 20 this
increases their index by 0.6 points. For an individual who is slightly malnourished
with an Quetelet index of 18, a 10 percent increase in FD pushes the individual
into the normal range of Quetelet index.16 Do malnourished individuals benefit
16Tests were run to check if aid had differential effects along the Quetelet distributions, none of the tests produced
significant results.
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more from aid? In low-asset households, aid has a larger impact on malnourished
individuals, a ten percent increase in aid allocations increases adult nutrition by 0.06
percent. Because we do not know individual allocations of aid we can not conclude
that malnourished individuals receive more aid resources.
Does gender of the recipient matter? Table 9 and 10 replicates the regressions
from table 7 and 8 but now breaks up aid receipts by gender of the recipient. For low-
asset households, aid still has a positive and significant effect on nutritional status
regardless of the gender of the recipient. For women, it appears that aid only has an
effect if the recipient is also a female. A f-test for a test that the coefficient on aid
receipts from men is the same as aid receipts from women is not rejected.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the effects of food aid in the form of free distribution on
adult nutrition using fixed effects regression methods. Results suggest that adult
household members in low-asset households benefit from FD whereas the effect of
FD on adult nutrition was not significant in high-asset households. Gender of the aid
recipient did not matter, male and female recipients appeared to allocate resources
the same. Results showed that malnourished individuals benefited the most from aid
receipts. This could be due to more resources flowing to malnourished individuals
or nutrition is more responsive to caloric consumption at lower levels of nutrition.
This analysis is important for public policy because it reveals how public assistance
resources effect the nutritional status of adults. Because of the role health and
productivity plays in escaping poverty it is important to evaluate not only targeting
efficiencies of public assistance programs, but also the effects that safety nets play in
improving the health and potential productivity of adults. If it is true that improved
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health increases productivity, then the results suggest that aid may have an effect
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of Adult BMI: High-Asset Households Female Sample
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Gender of Recipient













Male Head 0.95 0.27 0.91 0.6 0.89 0.88
(0.23) (0.46) (0.28) (0.5) (0.32) (0.33)
Log Aid PC 9.61 8.79 9.6 9.31 8.26 7.93
(0.7) (3.23) (0.92) (5.03) (0.57) (0)
Log Food Cons. PC 6.9 7 10.17 11.03 9.17 9.49
(5.05) (4.03) (3.41) (1.88) (4.24) (3.15)
Log Non-Food Exp. PC 2.04 1.63 1.63 1.9 2.35 2.35
(0.94) (0.92) (1.27) (1.18) (1.09) (0.78)
Hhsize 5.64 5.07 6.17 6.47 6.25 7.36
(1.91) (1.83) (2.34) (2.85) (2.2) (2.34)
Log Livestock Value 5.17 5.14 4.31 4.59 5.06 3.74
(1.97) (2.07) (2.49) (2.1) (1.64) (2.53)
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Sample consists of 259 households. Adults between the ages of 17 and 55. Recipient households consist of households
which reported receiving aid during the the 1994-1995 survey rounds.
Table 3.2: Mean BMI Score
rnd
1 2 3
Peasant Associations Men Women Men Women Men Women
geblen 20.4 20.61 19.83 19.51 20.15 19.34
dinki 19.32 19.41 19.88 19.26 19.22 19.7
shumsha 20.71 21.15 20.11 21.09 20.75 21.44
korodegaga 18.68 19.79 19.29 20.57 19.17 20.18
Imdibir 16.51 18.13 18.05 19.49 17.14 18.96
doma 19.35 19.69 20.57 20.77 19.26 19.57
Total 19.34 19.99 19.78 20.38 19.5 20.13
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Adults between the ages of 17 and 55. Sample includes 262 men and 285 women.
Table 3.3: Mean of Minimum as a percentage of Maximum
Low-Asset Households High-Asset Households
Peasant Associations Male Female Male Female
geblen 91.92 91.88 92.8 88.61
dinki 87.02 87.27 88.35 85.98
shumsha 88.93 92.07 88.07 90.86
korodegaga 93.75 90.63 92.64 91.7
Imdibir 89.12 86.24 88.1 92
doma 89.18 87.22 90.69 88.83
Total 90.64 89.41 90.55 89.84
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Adults between the ages of 17 and 55. Sample includes 262 men and 285 women.
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Table 3.4: Chronic Energy Deficiency in Rural Ethiopia, 1994-95
rnd
Measure of Energy Deficiency 1 2 3
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Normal: bmi ≥ 18.5 66.41 73.68 76.34 83.51 71.37 77.54
Grade I: 17 ≥ bmi < 18.5 20.23 17.54 17.18 11.93 20.61 15.79
Grade II: 16 ≥ bmi < 17 8.4 5.26 3.82 2.46 5.34 4.91
Grade III: bmi < 16 4.96 3.51 2.67 2.11 2.67 1.75
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Adults between the ages of 17 and 55. Sample includes 262 men and 285 women.
Table 3.5: Fraction of Food Consumption in the Form of Aid
rnd
Peasant Associations 1 2 3 Total
geblen 0.00 15.65 0.00 15.65
dinki 0.00 47.29 0.00 47.29
shumsha 55.12 18.73 27.96 34.96
korodegaga 75.71 32.51 20.67 35.62
Imdibir 0.00 0.00 15.14 15.14
doma 0.00 25.34 0.00 25.34
Total 63.13 29.40 23.58 33.59
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Notes: Sample includes 259 households. Zeros represent the round the village did not receive aid.
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Table 3.6: Data Description
Variables Used in the Analysis
Individual Characteristics
Age Age of the Respondent.
Age Squared Age Squared.
Lactating Dummy variable equal to one if female is pregnant or breastfeed-
ing.
Lost Work The number of days in the past four weeks respondent was unable
to perform their main activity.
Labor Sharing The number of days in the past four weeks respondent participated
in a traditional labor sharing arrangement.
Household Characteristics
Log Aid Per Capita (m/f) Amount of aid the household received since the previous survey
round converted to monthly kcal value (male or female recipient).
Log Food Expenditure Monthly household food expenditure net gifts. Equals food con-
sumption consumed in the seven days prior to the survey round
and converted to monthly kcal value.
Log NonFood Expenditure Monthly household non-food expenditure.
Number Male The number of household members who are male and between the
ages of 17 and 55.
Number Children The number of household members who are below the age of 17.
Number Female The number of household member who are female and between
the ages of 17 and 55.
Number Old The number of household member who are above the age of 55.
Log Livestock Value Value of livestock holdings per capita.
Interactive Terms
Female Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female.
Maln Dummy equal to one if the respondent witnessed a spell of mal-
nourishment during the survey round.
Low-Assets Dummy equal to one if the household has lower than the median
village asset holdings.
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Table 3.7: Fixed-Effects Estimation of The Effects of Free Distribution on Adult Nutritional Status:
Low Asset Households
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Quetelet Index
(Variables) (Full Sample) (Men) (Women)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Aid PC 0.0039*** 0.0030** 0.0035** 0.0029* 0.0042* 0.0033*
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Maln*aid 0.0026** 0.0020* 0.0030
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0019)
age -0.0035 -0.0055 -0.0370 -0.0392 0.0199 0.0175
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0318) (0.0311)
agesq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Days Not Worked -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0017** -0.0017* -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Lactating 0.0245** 0.0235** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0243* 0.0228*
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0124) (0.0123)
Labor Sharing Arrg. -0.0049* -0.0047 -0.0068** -0.0064** -0.0014
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0063)
Log Food Cons. 0.0015 0.0015* 0.0020* 0.0020* 0.0009 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Log NonFood Exp. 0.0032 0.0033 0.0037 0.0040 0.0028 0.0028
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0054)
Log Livestock Val. -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0031 -0.0029
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Num Female -0.0199** -0.0181* -0.0091 -0.0071 -0.0257* -0.0247*
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0132) (0.0135)
Num Male -0.0293** -0.0293** -0.0122 -0.0121 -0.0445*** -0.0444***
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0163)
Num Child -0.0100* -0.0097* -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0191** -0.0188**
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Num Old 0.2122*** 0.2138*** 0.1162*** 0.1194*** 0.2944*** 0.2972***
(0.0299) (0.0294) (0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0427) (0.0426)
Constant 3.0599*** 3.1317*** 3.7913*** 3.8907*** 2.5874*** 2.6498***
(0.4312) (0.4194) (0.5748) (0.5800) (0.6572) (0.6252)
Time-Varying Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.20 0.21
Obs. 762 762 369 369 393 393
Groups 254 254 123 123 131 131
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Clustered at the household level. Sample includes adults between the ages of 17 and 55 for which complete data
was available for all three rounds. Only includes households which had complete information for at least one male and one
female. Low Asset households consists of households whose value of livestock holdings are less than the village median.
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Table 3.8: Fixed-Effects Estimation of The Effects of Free Distribution on Adult Nutritional Status:
High Asset Households
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Quetelet Index
(Variables) (Full Sample) (Men) (Women)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Aid PC 0.0023* 0.0017 0.0030* 0.0020 0.0015 0.0013
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Maln*aid 0.0015 0.0022 0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0012)
age 0.0117 0.0095 0.0158 0.0178 0.0136 0.0131
(0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0390) (0.0393) (0.0275) (0.0280)
agesq -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Days Not Worked -0.0013** -0.0013** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0022*** -0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Lactating 0.0198* 0.0193* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0224* 0.0225*
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Labor Sharing Arrg. -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0032 -0.0033 0.0050
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0041)
Log Food Cons. -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Log NonFood Exp. 0.0042 0.0040 0.0023 0.0022 0.0056 0.0058
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Log Livestock Val. 0.0084 0.0090 0.0173 0.0182 -0.0020 -0.0020
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0186) (0.0188) (0.0165) (0.0165)
Num Female -0.0191* -0.0183 -0.0139 -0.0137 -0.0239 -0.0212
(0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0164) (0.0155)
Num Male 0.0132* 0.0138* 0.0152 0.0168 0.0131 0.0128
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0092) (0.0090)
Num Child 0.0029 0.0030 0.0097 0.0091 -0.0012 -0.0016
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0066) (0.0065)
Num Old 0.0330** 0.0327** 0.0122 0.0137 0.0407** 0.0393**
(0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0186) (0.0187)
Constant 2.7060*** 2.7713*** 2.5011*** 2.4837*** 2.8296*** 2.8554***
(0.5462) (0.5539) (0.8856) (0.8888) (0.6105) (0.6319)
Time-Varying Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.17
Obs. 879 879 417 417 462 462
Groups 293 293 139 139 154 154
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Clustered at the household level. Sample includes adults between the ages of 17 and 55 for which complete data
was available for all three rounds. Only includes households which had complete information for at least one male and one
female. High Asset households consists of households whose value of livestock holdings are greater than the village median.
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Table 3.9: Fixed-Effects Estimation of The Effects of Free Distribution on Adult Nutritional Status:
Gender of Recipient, Low Asset Households
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Quetelet Index
(Variables) (Full Sample) (Men) (Women)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnaidfpc 0.0038*** 0.0022 0.0042** 0.0027 0.0035** 0.0017
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Maln*aid (Female Rec) 0.0040** 0.0038 0.0045*
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0027)
lnaidmpc 0.0027* 0.0021 0.0034** 0.0029** 0.0021 0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Maln*aid (Male Rec) 0.0020* 0.0018 0.0019
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0019)
age -0.0040 -0.0059 -0.0364 -0.0395 0.0182 0.0177
(0.0205) (0.0201) (0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0314) (0.0314)
agesq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Days Not Worked -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0017* -0.0017* -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Lactating 0.0236** 0.0233** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0227* 0.0226*
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Labor Sharing Arrg. -0.0051* -0.0047 -0.0071** -0.0066**
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Log Food Cons. -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Log NonFood Exp. 0.0045 0.0044 0.0030 0.0029 0.0060 0.0059
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Log Livestock Val. 0.0107 0.0121 0.0214 0.0230 -0.0015 -0.0006
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Num Female -0.0191* -0.0187 -0.0137 -0.0141 -0.0216 -0.0214
(0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0156) (0.0158)
Num Male 0.0130* 0.0143* 0.0153 0.0192 0.0122 0.0123
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Num Child 0.0037 0.0039 0.0115 0.0118 -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Num Old 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0096 0.0109 0.0388** 0.0386**
(0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0185) (0.0192)
Constant 2.6527*** 2.6531*** 2.4843*** 2.3448*** 2.7473*** 2.7940***
(0.5364) (0.5400) (0.8792) (0.8767) (0.6023) (0.6179)
Time-Varying Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.17
Obs. 879 879 417 417 462 462
Groups 293 293 139 139 154 154
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Clustered at the household level. Sample includes adults between the ages of 17 and 55 for which complete data
was available for all three rounds. Only includes households which had complete information for at least one male and one
female. Low Asset households consists of households whose value of livestock holdings are less than the village median.
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Table 3.10: Fixed-Effects Estimation of The Effects of Free Distribution on Adult Nutritional Status:
Gender of Recipient, High Asset Households
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Quetelet Index
(Variables) (Full Sample) (Men) (Women)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnaidfpc -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0016)
Maln*aid (Female Rec) -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0016
(0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0029)
lnaidmpc 0.0021* 0.0014 0.0033** 0.0020 0.0008 0.0005
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Maln*aid (Male Rec) 0.0020** 0.0029** 0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
age 0.0137 0.0142 0.0137 0.0201 0.0181 0.0164
(0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0390) (0.0390) (0.0267) (0.0272)
agesq -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Days Not Worked -0.0013** -0.0013** 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0023*** -0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Lactating 0.0195* 0.0200* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0226** 0.0228*
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0114) (0.0116)
Labor Sharing Arrg. -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0044 -0.0049
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Log Food Cons. -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Log NonFood Exp. 0.0045 0.0044 0.0030 0.0029 0.0024 0.0059
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0049)
Log Livestock Val. 0.0107 0.0121 0.0214 0.0230 -0.0030 -0.0006
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0026) (0.0163)
Num Female -0.0191* -0.0187 -0.0137 -0.0141 -0.0274** -0.0214
(0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0135) (0.0158)
Num Male 0.0130* 0.0143* 0.0153 0.0192 -0.0407** 0.0123
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0162) (0.0091)
Num Child 0.0037 0.0039 0.0115 0.0118 -0.0194** -0.0016
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0065)
Num Old 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0096 0.0109 0.2913*** 0.0386**
(0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0438) (0.0192)
Constant 2.6527*** 2.6531*** 2.4843*** 2.3448*** 2.6481*** 2.7940***
(0.5364) (0.5400) (0.8792) (0.8767) (0.6358) (0.6179)
Time-Varying Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.17
Obs. 879 879 417 417 393 462
Groups 293 293 139 139 131 154
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes: Clustered at the household level. Sample includes adults between the ages of 17 and 55 for which complete data
was available for all three rounds. Only includes households which had complete information for at least one male and one
female. High Asset households consists of households whose value of livestock holdings are greater than the village median.
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CHAPTER IV
(Why) Do Self-Employed Parents Have More Children?
4.1 Introduction
It is well known that agents facing risk and uncertainty on their own find it optimal
to seek arrangements to mitigate that risk. These arrangements could be market
based, such as insurance schemes, which could be privately or publicly-provided.
But, it is also well known that such schemes are never complete, as agency problems
and other types of frictions preclude the provision of full insurance. As a result,
agents continue to seek other forms of insurance, despite the exclusivity clauses in
many of the formal insurance contracts. These other forms of arrangements, which
are typically referred to as non-market arrangements, fall outside the market-based
ones, and are used to complete or to substitute for the presence or lack thereof of
market based insurance schemes. For example, family co-insurance arrangements,
which include inter-vivos transfers as well as bequests, familial loans and other forms
of financial assistance, are typically geared to assist family members in need – for
example, see Cox (1987), Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), Altig and Davis (1992), and
Bernheim and Kolikoff (2001).
Implicit in these non-market arrangements, however, is the assumption that some-
how the agents involved in the co-insurance arrangements find it optimal to adhere to
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their promises, which are normally made ex-ante. That is, it is possible that promises
of help made before an accident, are reneged on after the fact. Or, the presence of
such transfers may induce moral hazard type problems, leading to the failure of such
arrangements. Thus, the question is what mitigates such situations? Arnott and
Stiglitz (1991) suggest ‘peer monitoring’ as one mechanism through which agency
problems among co-insuring agents can be mitigated. Chami and Fischer (1996)
show that trust may preclude the need for costly monitoring, as trust does away
with the gains from such type of externalities. But trust or mutual caring are only
important here in the sense that they insure that agents through such sentiments
can find a match, that is a person who shares their views, ideals, or their preferences,
which would help reduce the agency problem, and preclude costly negotiations or the
need for monitoring. But, the question now is how can one be sure of finding that
agent who shares similar preferences?
In this paper, we explore this insight further in the context of self-employed agents.
Such individuals present a natural example of individuals facing risk on their own,
and who are in need of finding ways of mitigating such needs. One way could
be through marriage. Recently, Chami and Hess (2002) and Hess (2004) explore
theoretical and empirical aspects of individuals who attempt to offset idiosyncratic
risk to their incomes by marrying hedges.
Another way in which risks to a family could be offset would be through procre-
ation! The latter is easier to see in the context of a farmer facing risk, and where
having children help mitigate that risk. Typically, the explanation given is that farm-
ers view children as assets. They help in farming, among the other tasks that are
not easily market substitutable. Indeed, Dasgupta (1995) provides a number of ex-
amples linking the relationship between population growth and economic incentives
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and activity in developing economies.
There is, however, another compelling reason as to why farmers, like other self-
employed agents may decide to have more children. Farmers, like other family-
business owners, share a very important concern, unlike other economic agents, who
are employed in the market place. They are concerned with insuring that the farm
or family-owned business continues and prospers, even after they are gone. Thus,
succession is a major factor that motivates founders to choose a single child to inherit
the business. Having more children, despite its costs, would go a long way to finding
that person who shares the parents love for the business, or in other words, is as
close as possible to a perfect match. It is estimated that in the US and most western
economies, more than 75 % of all family firms are transferred to one child (see Gersick
et. al. 1997), and that number is much higher in developing economies. Thus the
business is not looked on as wealth to be shared equally among the siblings. In many
cases, the parent chooses one child to run the business, where the other members
are given side payments, but are not involved in managing the business – e.g., see
the famous Vanderbilt case described in Clark (1966). Moreover, this motive for
choosing an heir is not altruistically motivated; rather it is purely predicated on the
presumption that the child with the closest match to the parent, would ensure the
continued success of the business. Such a move would, in turn, maximize the value
of the firm to the parent/owner, and perhaps even to his or her children if a bequest
is made.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 4.2 we present a theory whereby
self-employed households choose their consumption plans as well as their family size,
and we empirically analyze the predictions in Section 4.3. More specifically, in sub-
Section 4.3.1 we describe the data used in this study, and in sub-Section 4.3.2 we
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provide simple tests of the differences in means and regression analysis to test whether
self-employed parents have more children. As well, we explore in sub-Section 4.3.3
some additional issues that might affect our results on self-employment status and
family size.
4.2 Theory
We now consider a model of a self-employed individual’s decision to have children.
In particular, we consider a theory based on a parent’s non-benevolent behavior.1
In the model, every individual born is endowed with an idea in period 0. Some are
promising, while others are not. Let s be the percentage of the population that is
endowed with a good idea, and 1 − s be the fraction of the population that is not.
Assume that those endowed without promising ideas can derive a living of V from
a firm during their period 1 working lives. Such income is, for simplicity, assumed
to be certain. Consumption in period 1 is supported by income less net-savings and
the costs of child rearing, while net-savings supports consumption in period 2. More
specifically, consumption in periods 1, c1, and 2, c2, equal:
c1 = V − a− α · n and c2 = a
where n is the number of children and α is the per-child cost of raising a child. For
simplicity, the rate of return on net-savings (a) is set equal to zero.
Alternatively, those born with a promising idea can choose to start their own firms
and reap a potential surplus. Unfortunately, the potential rewards from a start-up
business with promising ideas do not come free – it requires a start-up expense to
1 The assumption of non-benevolence is made for simplicity. The model’s main prediction, namely that self-
employed parents have more children, can be shown to work with a standard model of benevolence to their children.
This is so because the key mechanism, whereby having more children raises the parent’s expected value of the business
through an increased likelihood of a good match, remains in place even with benevolence. Indeed, benevolence may
magnify the effect as the enhanced financial prospects will raise the parents per-child gift. Mulligan (1997) examines
the interaction between the parent’s altruism and fertility choice, in a model where both fertility and altruism are
endogenous – also see the earlier work by Barro and Becker (1989).
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be paid in period one, and the value of the good idea is not known until period 2
when the business must be sold to provide the individual with retirement income.
Let ω > 0 be the start-up cost of a new business, and let Ṽ be the uncertain value
of his promising idea in period 1 when of working age. To make matters simple,
let the business yield V in period 1 with a potential surplus in period 2.2 Period 1
consumption is supported by business income less any net savings and the cost of
having children, namely:
c1 = V − ω − a− α · n
In the second period, the self-employed business person attempts to support his
second period consumption by selling the potential surplus created from his business
in the second period to a member of the next generation – e.g. a child. But at
what price? Let φ be the true value of the business’s surplus worth if the business
owner finds the right person who sees the value. However, as noted above, the key
to a family business is that with the insider’s valuation of the business being private
information, it is unlikely that an outsider ’s valuation of the business’s surplus is
worth more than 0. Why? Outsiders know that the family has private information
about the business that may not be currently observed or easily quantified.3 As a
consequence, outsiders will not want to pay for the business’s surplus – a premium
for the business. Of course, an inside family member may also not see the true value
of the firm. To capture this phenomenon, let us assume that with probability 1− p
the self-employed business owner does not find an insider or outsider match that sees
the full value of the business. Hence, if the business owner does not find a match,
2Note that it must be incentive compatible for the individual with a promising idea to be willing to undertake a
start-up. This can be achieved by lowering the start-up cost, ω relative to the expected surplus, λφ, described below.
3While the policymakers are currently enthralled with accounting irregularities in large publicly traded companies,
the problem could be much worse in privately-held, family businesses – e.g. chaebols in South Korea. Tax evasion
and under-the-table payments may also be a formidable factor for self-employed businesses. As such, the market
value of these privately held firms may be extremely difficult for outsiders to determine, though less so for family
insiders.
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the value of his firm’s surplus is 0 in period 2. Alternatively, with probability p
the business owner may find an insider or an outsider who has the skills needed to
see the business’s full potential or true value. Consistent with observed facts, we
assume that the business owner sells it to just one individual and that the owner and
purchaser share the surplus. Since the individual who buys the business will also be
endowed with some ideas of his own, the sale price of the business is φλ, where λ is
the fraction of the surplus that the firm owner keeps.
To recap, there are two possible outcomes for the business owner in period 2. If
he has a promising idea but does not match with someone who sees the value, then
cNM2 = a. Finally, if he has a promising idea and finds a match then c
M
2 = a + φλ.
Taken together, the self-employed households decision is to choose the number of
children and the amount of net savings to maximize welfare:
(4.1) max
{n,a}
W = θ · n + U(c1) + (1− p) · U(cNM2 ) + p · U(cM2 )
where θ represents a household’s exogenous and random preference for children,
U ′(.) > 0, U ′′(.) < 0 and cM2 > c
NM
2 .
As mentioned above, these potential matches and the sale of a business are avail-
able only to the fraction of the population, s, that are born with promising ideas.
By comparison, the fraction of the population 1− s who are born without promising
ideas can be thought of as individuals where the probability p is zero of ever finding
a promising match for expression (4.1). Notice that since starting a new business in-
volves a start-up cost, and since those who start out working lives without promising
ideas do not have a chance to reap any surplus, only those born with promising ideas
will attempt to start a business on their own. Of course, to insure that individuals
with promising ideas are willing to start their own businesses, it must be that the
expected return to doing so (φ ·λ) is sufficiently large relative to the start-up cost ω.
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The key to the model is that the probability of finding a match, p, may be affected
by family size. Consider the following components that go into the probability of an
owner of a family business finding a match. Let γ0, 0 ≤ γ0 ≤ 1, be the probability
that the business owner is approached by an outsider, who has enough expertise and
knowledge to see the true inside value of the firm. Furthermore, let γ1, 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1,
be the per-child probability that a business owner’s progeny sees the true value of
the firm. For example, if a business owner has a good business but no children, his
chance of finding a match is γ0. If he has one child it is 1− (1− γ0) · (1− γ1). With
two children, the probability of a match is 1 − (1 − γ0) · (1 − γ1)2. More generally,
for “n” number of children, the probability of finding a match is:
p(n) = 1− (1− γ0) · (1− γ1)n
Note that p(n) is increasing in γ0, γ1, and n, where p
′(n) = −(1 − γ0) · (1 − γ1)n ·
log(1 − γ1)≥ 0, where the equation holds with equality only if γ1 = 0 or γ0 = 1.4
Note that if γ1 = 0, then the probability of a match is constant and independent of
n.
The optimality condition for a turns out to be the standard relationship where
the business owner equates the marginal utility from consumption in period 1 with
the expected marginal utility from consuming in period 2: namely,
(4.2) U ′(c1)− (1− p(n)) · U ′(cNM2 )− p(n) · U ′(cM2 ) = 0
The optimality condition for the number of children, n, is the following:
(4.3) θ − α · U ′(c1) + p′(n) ·
{
U(cM2 )− U(cNM2 )
}
= 0
The first two terms of equation (4.3) represent the standard marginal benefit and
marginal cost of having children. The final term, reflects the positive impact that
4Note that: dp(n)/dγ1 = +(1− γ0) · n · (1− γ1)n−1 > 0.
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having more children has on making a a positive business match. Note that if having
more children does not help in matching, then γ1 = 0 and p
′(n) = 0, so that the last
term vanishes.
The key proposition that we want to show is that if having more children increases
your ability to obtain a good match, then self-employed people will have more of
them. There are two distinct effects. The first is the direct effect of how γ1 affects
the optimality condition for the optimal choice of the number of children, expression
(4.3). It is straightforward to see that this direct effect will be positive: from the
optimality condition for the number of children, expression (4.3), the marginal benefit
for having more children rises as long as p′(n) > 0. In other words, if having more
children makes it easier to find a successful match, this will raise the desire to have
more children. The second effect is to see how the choice of n is indirectly affected
by a change in γ1 that affects the optimal choice of net-savings in the intertemporal




















Linearizing the system of two unknowns, n and a, and two equations, (4.2) and (4.3),







































































Critical to signing the effect is to note that ∂p′(n)/∂γ1 > 0 for 1 > γ1 ≥ 0. 5 It is
straightforward to show that the numerator and denominator are both positive, so
that dn/dγ1|γ1=0 > 0.
5Note that
p′′(n) = −(1− γ0) · (log(1− γ1))2 · (1− γ1)n < 0,
∂p′(n)/∂γ1 = (1− γ0) · (1− γ1)n−1 · (1− n · log(1− γ1)) > 0.
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While the above model provides the important prediction that individuals who are
self-employed will want to have more children than they would if they were not self-
employed, it did so by assuming non-benevolence to their children. As alluded to in
footnote 1, this assumption allows us to present the prediction in the simplest model
possible. Indeed, while the optimal number of children would take into account all
the standard costs and benefits to the decision maker of having an additional child
(i.e. child rearing costs, the non-pecuniary utility benefit from having children, the
cost an extra child on watering down the per-child bequest, etc...), the fact remains
that as long as self-employed individuals have an additional matching benefit for
having children, that is increasing the likelihood of the business’s succession, they
will choose to have more children. As such, the theory’s prediction can be shown to
hold for model’s with explicit bequests and benevolent parents.6
4.3 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model presented above provides a strong prediction: namely, that
individuals who own businesses will have larger preferred family sizes. However, we
are confronted with a number of practical issues when implementing an empirical
test of this prediction. First, most data sets do not comprehensively ask questions
about whether an individual is part of a family business.7 However, a type of family
business that is consistently and comprehensively recorded in the annual General
Social Survey (GSS) is whether the respondent is self-employed. From the perspective
of our model, self-employment captures the main features we are attempting to proxy
6In a related paper, Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers (1985) explore the theoretical and empirical aspects of
a strategic bequest motive where parents condition their bequests on the actions of their children’s actions. Our
strategic motive in this paper, endogenizing the number of children, is complementary to their strategic bequest
motive. See Chami (2001) for an extensive theoretical treatment of the issues surrounding strategic bequests and
family businesses.
7This shortcoming is shared by the standard data sets that one might consider to use for testing our prediction –
i.e. the the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the
General Social Survey (GSS), as either the question is limited to a specific age group, or the question changes, or is
just asked in a few years.
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in a potential family business: namely, an individual who owns a business and who
at some point would benefit from selling the business off to either an outsider or
an inside family member.8 Hence, we use self-employment status throughout the
empirical work below to proxy the type of individual who owns a business and whose
preferred family size may be influenced by the factors identified in our theory.
Second, there exists the possibility that the empirical work below, which attempts
to identify how self-employment status may affect the respondent’s preferred number
of children, suffers from some type of reverse causality. In other words, perhaps indi-
viduals who prefer larger family sizes decide to choose self-employment over working
for some other business. While we cannot ignore this possibility, we adopt a few mea-
sures to help ensure that this problem does not cloud our findings. More importantly,
we provide instrumental variables estimates which should help overcome any endo-
geneity bias from our estimated effect of self-employment status on the respondent’s
actual and expected number of children. As well, we provide additional evidence in
sub-section 4.3.3 that indicates that respondents who are self-employed work more
hours and do not seem to have more “family friendly” jobs as compared to workers
who are not self-employed. As such, this would suggest that self-employment status
may not be a good haven for workers with lots of children as a way to better fit their
work into their family lives.
8Interestingly, in 1996 the GSS did ask whether the respondent was a member of a family business. The question
asked, “Do you work for pay in a farm or other business owned in whole or in substantial part by a member or members
of your family (parents, grandparents, children, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, or first cousins?” 54 respondents
answered yes, while 1381 responded no. Of the 54 who said yes, about half answered that they were self-employed.
Note that whether an individual works for a family business is not quite the right question for what we are looking
for. For instance, a respondent who works for a family firm and does not own it (or never anticipates owning it)
would respond ‘Yes’ to the question of working for a family firm, would likely answer ‘No’ to being self-employed, and
nevertheless would not, according to our line of theory, want to have more children. As this demonstrates, responses
to the self-employment question are likely to be a better proxy for the incentives of an owner of a family business as
compared to the family business question itself.
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4.3.1 The Data
In this section, we begin by describing the data employed in the paper. The GSS
is an annual survey which asks respondents specific questions concerning family size
and employment status. As well, it asks numerous other questions which we use to
control for demographic variation and individual heterogeneity in their preferences
for family size. The respondents are not re-interviewed across years so that the data
are repeated cross sections rather than a panel. A description of the variables we
examine is presented in the Data Appendix.9
The key variable of interest for this study is a measure of a respondent’s family
size. We adopt a number of measures of this from the data available in the GSS:
namely, the respondent’s actual number of children, KIDS, and their actual plus
expected additional children, TOTKIDS. The latter may be an important measure
of family size for younger respondents who may be planning to add children to their
current family size in order to reach their preferred family size.
Of course, the self-employment status of the family is also a key variable of in-
terest in this study. We denote SELFE to be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
respondents report that they are self-employed, and zero otherwise.10 As discussed
above, self-employment is our proxy for a family business, as self-employment pro-
vides perhaps the greatest opportunity to pass down a business to a member of the
next generation of one’s own family. Hence, if our theory is correct, the motivation
for succession and insuring the business’s survival is likely to be key component in
the fertility decisions of the self-employed. To control for additional family related
factors influencing a respondent’s family size, we allow for a number of variables
9There are a total number of 15 thousand respondents who were not retired or in school (nor were their spouses if
they had one) and responded to family size and self-employment questions throughout most years in 1972-2002. For
the sample of currently married male respondents who are not in school nor retired (nor are their spouses), summary
statistics for the key variables are reported in the Table 1.
10The exact wording is: ‘ (Are/Were) you self-employed or (do/did) you work for someone else? ’.
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related to the respondent’s family. For instance, MARRIED is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the respondent is currently married. As well, SPOUSEH is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the work status of the respondents spouse
was ‘taking care of the house’, and 0 otherwise.
Additional explanatory variables which we use to control for observable factors
that can systematically influence an agent’s preference for more children are the
respondent’s age, AGE, sex, MALE, and a measure of their perceived financial sta-
tus relative to others, FINRELA.11 We also constructed measures of work and life
experience: GENERATION is the year that the respondent was born, and LMEX
is the respondent’s labor market experience, namely their age minus their number
of years of schooling minus 6. We also use highest educational attainment for the
respondent and the spouse as possible controls for the respondent’s preference for
children: DIPHR, DIPJCR, DIPBAR, DIPGDR, DIPHSP, DIPJCSP, DIPBASP,
and DIPGDSP are dummy variables for whether the highest diploma (DIP) was for
high school (H), junior college (JC), four year college (BA) or for graduate school
(GD), earned by the respondent (R) and spouse (SP).12 Additional demographic
information is contained in the dummy variables JEWISH and CATHOLIC, for re-
spondent listed religion, WHITE and BLACK, for whether a respondent lists this as
their race. City size effects are also controlled for: CTYSZ1 is a dummy variable if
the respondent’s residence is less than 10,000, and 0 otherwise. CTYSZ2, CTYSZ3
and CTYSZ4 are similarly defined for population ranges 10,000 to 100,000, 100,000
to 1 million, and greater than 1 million, respectively.
11FINRELA is measured on a self reported scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being that your financial status is well below
the mean, 2 being that it is below the mean, 3 being that it is about the mean, 4 being that it is above the mean,
and 5 being that it is far above the mean. While the GSS does report family income for some years, it does not do
so for all years.
12Unfortunately, not all demographic questions are asked for both the respondent and his/her spouse. As noted
below, this leads us to only use Male respondents for the majority of our empirical work. Note that the main result,
that self-employed respondents have more children, holds for the full sample, and a large fraction of the sub-samples,
including Males and Females separately.
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Finally, we also control for the respondent’s reported INDUSTRY using a se-
ries of eleven dummy variables: Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing,
Transportation, Wholesale, Retail, Finance (FIRE), Entertainment, and Public Ad-
ministration, and Professional Services. We also use the information on the respon-
dent’s family background that they were raised in: SIBS is their number of siblings,
while IMGRNT, IMGRNTPA and IMGRNTMA are dummy variables that denote
whether the respondent, the respondent’s father and mother were immigrants, respec-
tively. Moreover, ETHNIC ORIGIN denotes the country the respondent’s ancestors
came from: Africa, Austria, French Canada, Other Canada, China, Czech Republic,
Denmark, England, Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Dutch Holland, Norway, Philippians, Poland, Puerto
Rico, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Indies, and Other.
4.3.2 Evidence
In the following sub-sections, we examine the main prediction from our theory:
namely, that individuals who are self-employed are more likely to have larger families
than those who are not self-employed. Sub-section 4.3.2 presents the stylized facts of
the data we employ for this study. Sub-section 4.3.2 provides a more formal empirical
test of our hypothesis.
Empirical Regularities
Table 1 provides an interesting set of empirical regularities in the data. For
purposes described below, the primary data set we examine in this study includes only
currently married males who are neither currently enrolled in school nor retired nor
are their spouses.13 The first column of the data lists variable names, while columns
13As we demonstrated below in Tables 2 and 4, the general finding that respondents who report that they are self-
employed have significantly more children hold for both men and women. However, while the GSS reports the spouse’s
self employment status, it does not provide much of the important demographic information for the respondent’s
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two through four present the variable’s mean, standard deviation and median. The
final three columns of the table report the correlation coefficient between the variable
in the first column and the three key variables of interest in this study: namely, KIDS,
KIDSTOT, and SELFE, respectively. As reported in the table, the respondent’s
average number of actual and expected children is 2.2 and 2.4, respectively, while
the average number of siblings is relatively larger at 3.8. The average respondent
is just over 40 years old, has over 13 years of schooling and has approximately 23
years of labor market experience. The majority of the sample reports their race as
WHITE, their religion as PROTESTANT and lives in a city size of under 100,000
(CTYSZ1 and CTSZ2 combined).14
The correlation coefficients reported in Table 1 also reveal a number of interesting
findings between the variables of interest. First, as expected, the actual and expected
number of children are highly correlated. Consequently, other variables have similar
correlation patterns with these two variables. Second, age and labor market experi-
ence are positively and significantly correlated with the actual and expected number
of children. Moreover, these correlations are large. Also of interest, the respondent’s
education is negatively correlated with the number of children, while his number
of siblings and whether his wife works in the home is positively correlated with his
number of children. Also, respondents that are BLACK, or from smaller cities, or
that are CATHOLIC, tend to have more children.
Finally, approximately 18 percent of the respondents list themselves as ‘self-
employed’.15 Interestingly, self-employment status and the number of children is pos-
spouse. Hence we believe that given data availability the male only sample provides a more comprehensive picture
of the relationship between self-employment status and family size.
14Friedlander and Silver (1967) argue that less dense populations are likely to have lower living costs, and thus
would be more likely to have higher fertility rates.
15Again, this is for married men who are not retired, nor in school, nor are their spouses. The mean self-employment
rate for women is 8.8 percent for married women who satisfy this same criteria.
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itively and significantly correlated. Also, self-employment status appears to be higher
for older respondents with more labor market experience, as well as for those who re-
port themselves as JEWISH. Finally, consistent with Fairlie and Meyer (1996,2000),
self-employment is significantly higher for WHITE’s and lower for BLACK’s.16 More-
over, as indicated by their significant negative correlations with GENERATION, both
self-employment and the number of children have decreased over time. As such, this
will be an important variable to control for in our regression results below in sub-
Section 4.3.2.17,18
Table 2 presents the difference of means by self-employment status. The first
column of the table lists the samples of interest, while column two provides the de-
pendent variables, namely KIDS and KIDSTOT. Columns three through five report
the average number of actual and expected kids for the full sample, the proportion
of the sample that is self-employed, and for the proportion of the sample that is
not self-employed, respectively. Column six presents the p-value of the test that
the means are equal across the two sub-samples (i.e. self-employed and not self
employed), while column seven displays the number of observations for the sample
of interest.19 The presentation of the means and the test of the equality of means
across the sub-samples is performed for both measures of the respondent’s number
of children – KIDS and KIDSTOT.
A key and fundamental observation from the Table 2 bears directly on the model’s
16Fairlie and Meyer (2000) test several hypotheses in order to explain the difference in black and white self-
employment rates. These hypotheses center on whether demographic changes have led to a decrease in the black/white
gap and whether the black/white gap is due primarily to the historically low self-employment rates and past inexperi-
ence of blacks. They find that demographic changes that occurred in the twentieth century did not have a large effect
on the black/white self-employment gap and using a simple intergenerational model of self-employment they find
that it is not only initial conditions that explain low black self-employment but also continuing forces that depress
black self-employment (i.e. discrimination or skills, capital, and intangibles that are passed intergenerationally).
17To note, the regression results not only include GENERATION as a right hand side variable, but they also
include dummy variables for the year in which the interview took place.
18The four largest industries represented among the self employed are (in order) Finance, Construction, Professional
Services, and Agriculture, respectively. The latter, which accounts for about 14 percent of the self employed in our
sample but are only 4 percent of sample, is excluded from our baseline empirical work in columns (V II) and (V III)
of Table 4. The results are unaffected by their exclusion.
19The underlying t-test is obtained using a procedure that is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
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main prediction: that is, for the full sample and for 81 out of the 94 sub-samples,
the average number of children, both as measured by KIDS and KIDSTOT, is larger
for the self-employed sub-sample versus the non-self- employed sub-sample. In other
words, in 81 out of 94 cases the means in column (V) are larger than those for
column (VI). Moreover, 56 out of the 94 tests of the equality of the means that are
reported in Table 2 are statistically significant at or below the .1 level, and in all
these cases the mean number of children of the self-employed is greater than that
of the non-self-employed. And often in these cases where the null hypothesis of no
difference between the two means fails to be rejected are typically for sub-samples
with a small relatively number of observations. For example, the sample of males
living in large cities (CTYSZ3 and CTYSZ4) have sample sizes of 693 and 203 and
fail to show any significant difference between the average number of children. There
are, however, a number of instances where the p-value is below .1 despite the small
sample size. For example, the sample size for Jewish men is only 84 but for both
measures of the dependent variable, the difference in the means is significant at the
.1 level. Interestingly, there does seem to be some regional variation in differences of
the means. These regional variables will be in the regression results below and are
often statistically significant.
Table 2 provides some other interesting findings. First, regardless of their marital
status, men who are self-employed have, on average, a higher number of actual and
expected kids as compared to men that are not self-employed – the difference in
means is significant at below the .01 level. Second, regardless of immigration status
and the immigration status of the respondents father, those who are self-employed
have a statistically significant higher average number of kids. Similarly, regardless of
the respondents spouses work status (SPOUSEH), and the familys relative income
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(FINRELA), men who are self- employed on average tend to have a significantly
larger number of actual and expected kids. Finally, there is also some heterogeneity
of differences in the actual and expected number of children even within industry
classifications. Interestingly, within each of the Retail, Financial and Professional
Services industries, self-employed respondents have more actual and expected chil-
dren. These findings are of interest, as many of these industries are likely to exem-
plify the type where a self-employed business could benefit from a child who sees
the private value to the business (e.g. a retail shop, an insurance business, a dentist
practice, etc...).20 Taken together, we believe that the results in Table 2 provide
extremely strong preliminary evidence in favor of the prediction: namely, ceteris
paribus, self-employed respondents have more children.
Estimation
To test the hypothesis that the self-employed have more kids, we regress measures
of family size (KIDS and KIDSTOT) on a dummy variable for whether the respon-
dent is self-employed (SELFE) and a number of control variables to proxy for the
respondents preferences for their family size.21 The control variables can be thought
of as capturing household characteristics and demographics. Examples of the former
are whether or not the spouse stays at home (SPOUSEH) and the respondents per-
ceived financial relative position (FINRELA). Examples of the latter are features of
residential area (CTYSZ), the respondents age (AGE); and trends that may affect
20 That Financial (Finance, Real Estate and Insurance) and Professional Services industries demonstrate this
feature is particularly important for overcoming the following criticism: perhaps the cost of child rearing is cheaper
for the self-employed as they have a source of cheap, unpaid help. While this criticism could apply to some retail
stores (e.g. restaurants), it certainly would not apply to the more skilled professions inherent in Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate or Professional Services.
21Again, as in Table 1, the regression results will be only for married working males, though the results in Table 2
demonstrate that this fact is broader than for just this sub-sample of the data. The focus on men is primarily due to
the data incompleteness for the respondent’s spouse. Since married women are more likely to be part-time employed
as compared to men, their self-employment status is likely to be less important in the fertility decision. Unfortunately,
since we only have the parent’s self- employment status for the respondent but not for the respondent’s spouse, we
are missing crucial information for the instrumental variables estimation when we look at female respondents.
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the number of children a couple has over time: year of birth. The model is specified
as follows:
(4.5) Ni = β0 + β1 · SELFEi + β2 ·Xi + β3 · Ti + εi
where Ni represents the number of kids respondent i has or expects to have, Xi
represent household characteristics and demographics of respondent i, and Ti rep-
resent time dummy variables for the year in which the interview was conducted.
More specifically, the following variables are used as controls: SPOUSEH, FINRELA,
JEWISH, CATHOLIC, AGE, AGE2, GENERATION, LMEX, SIBS, BLACK, WHITE,
8 variables separately denoting the respondent and spouses highest degree obtained
(DIPHR, DIPJCR, DIPBAR, DIPGDR, DIPHSP, DIPJCSP, DIPBASP, and DIPGDSP),
three dummy variables for whether the respondent, father or mother were immigrants
to the U.S. (IMGRNT, IMGRNTPA and IMGRNTMA) 26 ethnic origin dummy vari-
ables, dummy variables for city size (CITYSZ1-4), and the 8 Census regions.22 The
data are described fully in the Data Appendix. Also, Table 1 and 2, as summa-
rized previously, provide some raw data on the variables of interest and the control
variables.
We estimate a number of empirical regressions of KIDS and KIDSTOT on the
explanatory variables. To control for the possibility of endogeneity among some of
the explanatory variables in particular, SELFE and SPOUSEH we also estimated
the specifications using instrumental variables, IV.23 While our theory predicts that
the self-employed will tend to have more kids, we cannot ignore the possibility that
families with more kids will see the benefits of a family business and choose to become
22The specifications also contains a constant, so that where appropriate a dummy variable is excluded so as to
avoid collinearity.
23More specifically, the instrumental variables approach we adopt is the two-step efficient Generalized Method of
Moments estimator.
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self-employed. Also, since women who stay home instead of work in the market have
more kids, a wife with more kids is more likely to stay at home – see the survey
in Blau (1998). To control for the possibility that SELFE and SPOUSEH may be
endogenous, we use a number of instruments, Z, that explain SELFE and SPOUSEH
but are exogenous to KIDS and KIDSTOT. In particular, the instruments used are
whether or not the respondents father was self-employed, the industry the respondent
works in, stability of the respondents household at age 16, the religious affiliation
of the respondent at age 16, and the financial relative status of the respondent at
age 16.24,25 As demonstrated in the p-values below, together these variables are
statistically significant predictors of SELFE and SPOUSEH, and the instruments
are not significantly correlated with the error term. As the number of instruments
exceeds the number of estimated coefficients, below we will test the over-identifying
restrictions that the residuals and the instruments are orthogonal – see the p-value
of the J-test below.
Table 3 provides estimation results of the specified key variables for the OLS and
24For example, Hout and Rosen (2002) demonstrate that the offspring of self-employed fathers are more likely
themselves to be self-employed, primarily for the reason we identify: namely, to hand down the business. Indeed,
in our data, the probability of a respondent being self-employed given that his father was self-employed is equal to
.279 (350/1255). In contrast, the probability falls to .141 (417/2965) if the respondent’s father is not self-employed.
The difference is statistically significant at below the .001 level. However, unlike Rees and Shah (1986), we do
not have earnings differentials to explain self-employment, but rather use industry dummy variables as a proxy.
Moreover, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) find evidence that a respondent’s receipt of a gift or inheritance increases
the likelihood of self-employment. Their explanation, consistent with their theory, is that such a windfall reduces
capital constraints on potential entrepreneurs. While such data is not available in the GSS, the likelihood of a gift
or inheritance is likely to be correlated with one of our instruments: namely, the respondent’s financial status at age
16.
Interestingly, the ‘succession’ motive for why self-employed parents have more children may be connected to this
‘borrowing constraint’ literature for the following reason: The within-family succession of a self-employed business
is less likely to fail because of borrowing constraints as compared to the sale of the business to an individual outside
the family. The reason is that families can use informal and non-market arrangements to compensate the parents for
the business. Moreover, the existence of borrowing constraints would make it even less likely for a business owner
to sell the business at a fair market price to an outsider, in addition to the information and monitoring reasons we
have already discussed. Hence, the fact that potential buyers outside the family will be more likely to be borrowing
constrained as compared to inside family members will magnify the desire of the self-employed to have more children
in order to raise the chances of obtaining a good internal match for the business’s succession.
25In general, the instruments are good predictors of the potentially endogeneous regressors. In Tables 3 and 4, the
p-value for SELFE and SPOUSEH reports the significance level of the F-test that, in a first stage regression, the
coefficients n the instrumental variables Z are not all jointly equal to zero when regressed against these variables.
In all cases, the p-value for SELFE is below .001 (with an associated F-statistic of over 30, while the p-value for
SPOUSEH ranges from .01 to .1, with an associated F-statistic of about 3. As the former is the basis of inquiry for
this study, we believe that our list of instruments is a good one.
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IV regressions for KIDS and KIDSTOT, the explanatory variables of interest are
presented in column one and the results for the IV regressions are reported in the
odd numbered columns. The table provides the coefficient estimates, their levels
of significance, and their standard errors. At the bottom of Table 3 are reported
p-values for several tests to be explained later.
The key result from Table 3 is that, after controlling for a whole host of demo-
graphic variables such as religion, age, labor market experience, race, immigration
status and other variables assumed to influence the number of kids an individual
may choose to have, the estimated coefficient on SELFE is positive and statistically
significant at below the .10 level in all regressions. The coefficient estimates from the
IV regressions show that a male who is self-employed has approximately 0.4 more
kids than his non-self-employed counterpart, and expects to have about 0.5 more
kids than a male of equal standing but who is non-self-employed. For the OLS re-
gressions, the coefficient estimates on SELFE are not as large in magnitude, though
they are still statistically significant in all four columns. These results indicate that
a self employed male has .139 more kids and expects to have .161 more kids than a
male who is not self-employed.
An important result that is in accordance with previous research on the optimal
number of kids is that the coefficient on FINRELA is negative and significant at the
.05 level. The negative relationship between income and fertility decisions found in
previous studies is assumed to explain a households decision to spread risk across
children – see Appelbaum and Katz (1991) as well as Mulligan (1997). Another
important result studied by many researchers is the role the mothers involvement
in the labor market has to do with a households decision to have kids. Previous
research has found that there is a negative relationship between a wifes labor market
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participation and the number of kids she gives birth to – see Willis (1973), Robinson
and Tomes (1982), and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985).26 Whether or not the spouse
stays at home is positive and highly significant in both OLS regressions but loses its
significance when instrumented for in the IV regressions – see footnote 31.
Some other interesting results observed in Table 3 are that the CATHOLIC vari-
able is positive and significant at the .01 level in each one of the regressions. In-
dividuals who are Catholic tend to have approximately .16 more kids and tend to
expect approximately .23 more kids. The JEWISH variable is negative in all regres-
sions, though it is not statistically significant. Older men tend to have more actual
and expected children, while the coefficient on the GENERATION variable, which
is used to capture the change in demographics and changes in family structure over
time, is negative for each of the regressions but is only significant for 1 of the 4
regressions. LMEX which is used to measure the husbands stability in the workforce
which in turn provides a measure of the stability of the household is positive in all
four of the regressions but only significant in both the OLS and the IV regressions
for KIDS, a male with an additional year of labor market experience appears to have
approximately .04 more kids.
Individual characteristics, for the most part, are as expected. The more siblings
you have the more likely you are to have and expect more kids. Blacks tend to have
more kids, and immigration status and mothers immigration status has no significant
effect on the number of kids you have, while fathers immigration status has a negative
and significant effect on the number of kids you have and expect to have.27
26These authors argue that raising children is labor intensive which is why it accounts for the negative relationship
with the mother’s labor market participation, particularly in the short run.
27Previous research such as Borjas (1986), and Fairlie and Meyer (1996), has found that several immigrant groups
have a statistically higher self-employment rate than the native born. While we do not show a statistical positive
correlation between immigration status and self-employment it could be due to the low number of observations or the
fact that we did not distinguish directly between different immigrant groups, though we do control for a respondents
ethnic origin.
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The p-values for the F-test of whether variables in sub-categories are all equal
to zero are reported at the bottom of Table 3. The diploma variables, the regional
variables and the ethnic origin variables all reject the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients are all zero for each of the regressions, implying that education, location, and
ethnicity influence the number of kids you have and expect to have.28 On the other
hand, the null hypothesis for the year variables is rejected for expected number of
kids but not for actual number of kids. The null hypothesis that all the coefficients
on the city size variables are zero is rejected for the actual number of kids but failed
to be rejected for the expected number of kids.
Also reported at the bottom of Table 3 is the p-value for the Hausman test, which
tests whether there is any significant difference between the OLS regression and
the IV regression for the estimated coefficients on SELFE and SPOUSEH. Under
the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity bias to self-employment status and
whether the respondents spouse stays at home, the estimated coefficients on these
two variables should be the same across the OLS and IV estimation methods, with
the exception that the IV estimate would be less efficient. If, however, the estimates
using OLS and IV are different, then this would indicate evidence against the null
hypothesis of no endogeneity bias. The results using the actual number of kids as
the dependent variable suggests that there is no significant difference between the IV
and OLS estimates of these key variables, which suggests that we do not have any
endogeneity problems. However, when the expected number of kids is the dependent
variable, there is a significant difference between the OLS and the IV regression at the
.10 level, which suggests that the IV regression will provide a more accurate estimate
of the effect of self-employment status on family size. The final three rows of Table
28In particular, the city size and Census Region variables – New England, Mid- Atlantic, Central NE, Central NW,
South Atlantic, Central SE, Central SW, and Pacific – proxy for the fact that environmental factors may explain
differences in birth rates – see Shultz (1969).
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3 provide further evidence that the IV regressions are meaningful. The row denoted
J-test is the orthogonality test between the estimated residuals and the instruments.
The p-value indicates that there is no evidence to suspect that the instruments are
correlated with the error term. Finally, the p-values denoted SELFE and SPOUSEH
are the p-value from an F-test of the null hypothesis that in a linear regression of
each of these variables on the instruments, that all the coefficients on the instruments
would be jointly equal to zero. As such, this type of test indicates whether the
instruments are correlated with the potentially endogenous regressors. As the p-
values indicate, however, the instruments are statistically significant predictors of
SELFE and SPOUSEH.
While the results in Table 3 provide consistently strong findings in support of
the theory’s prediction, the results in Table 4 provide additional results to show
the robustness of our findings. For example, in columns (I) through (X) of Table
4, we present both OLS and IV estimates of the coefficients for sub-samples where
respondents report that KIDS is positive, the respondent’s spouse stays at home
(SPOUSEH = 1), the respondent is currently in his first marriage (MAR1=1), for
respondents that are not in the agricultural industry (AG=0), and for respondents
that are not immigrants nor are their parents (IMGRNT=0).29 To keep the number
of results to a minimum, the dependent variable in each of these specifications is
KIDSTOT.30
Estimating the relationship between self-employment and family size over these
sub-samples is helpful for a number of reasons. First, individuals may not have a
29Interestingly, Friedlander and Silver (1967) find that as a country’s fraction of self-employed non-farm population
rises, that their fertility rate rises. Though they do not provide an explanation for this finding other than to conjecture
that there are lower child rearing costs for the self-employed, this fact is consistent both with our theory and empirical
work on individual household behavior. See footnote 20 for our argument why this is not likely to be an explanation
for our finding.
30To note, the results are similar when KIDS is used as the dependent variable.
87
particularly precise idea of their preferred family size (KIDSTOT) until they actually
have some children (KIDS > 0). Note, however, that the results in columns (I) and
(II) are very similar to those for the full sample. Second, since a prime determinant
of whether a spouse stays at home is whether they have children (and or whether
they have a larger number of children), the potential endogeneity of the variable
SPOUSEH may be worrisome. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, while the coefficient
on SPOUSEH is statistically significant in the OLS regressions, it is not so in the
IV ones.31 Interestingly, as shown in columns (III) and (IV) of Table 4, the OLS
estimate of the coefficient on SELFE is insignificantly different from zero, although
the IV estimate is significantly different from zero at the .01 level. Moreover, the
IV estimate on the coefficient on SELFE is quite large – i.e. it predicts that for
respondents with stay at home spouses, self-employed have over 1.0 additional chil-
dren than do the non-self-employed. Third, we report estimates for the sub-sample
of male respondents who are currently married and have never been married before
(MAR1).32 This sub-sample is important since the relationship between respondents
and children from prior marriages may cloud the empirical relationships that we are
attempting to investigate. However, as demonstrated in columns (V) and (VI), the
estimated specification is very close to that for the full sample – see Table 3 columns
(III) and (IV). Furthermore, as emphasized by Fairlie and Meyer (1996, 2000), we
re-explore our empirical findings by removing respondents who are in the agricultural
industry. As shown in columns (VII) and (VIII) of Table 4, however, the empirical
results are virtually identical when these respondents are removed from the sample.33
31 Of course, this is hampered by the fact that number of children is often an instrument for whether a spouse
stays at home. For example, see the survey in Blau (1998).
32The data is similar to that in Table 3 – that is, neither the respondent nor his spouse are retired or in school.
33While the level of statistical significance is no longer at below the .05 level, it is significant at the .06 level.
Moreover, the estimated coefficient value is very similar to that in our baseline specification in Table 3, although the
larger estimated standard error is consistent with the smaller sample size.
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As a final attempt to demonstrate the robustness of our findings across sub-samples,
columns (IX) and (X) report the model’s estimates when respondents who are immi-
grants or whose parents are immigrants are removed from the sample. Such a control
is of interest since respondents whose parents are immigrants are more likely to be
self-employed: see Table 1. However, as shown in columns (IX) and (X), the results
are unchanged from our baseline set of results when we remove respondents who are
immigrants or whose parents were immigrants from the sample.34
Table 4 also allows for a few changes to the econometric approach to estimating our
basic specification. In particular, since the number of children is bounded below by
zero, one may wonder whether our estimates are impacted by directly incorporating
this into our estimation procedure. To this end, column (XI) and (XI) report Tobit
and Instrumental Variables Tobit estimates of the key parameters. As the results
suggest, however, the using this more sophisticated approach provides estimates and
levels of significance almost identical to that using OLS and IV as presented in Table
3. Finally, in column (XIII) of Table 4, we re-estimate our specification using an
Ordered Probit model. Such an estimator would directly incorporate the fact that
the number of children discrete. Once again, however, the estimated pattern of signs
and statistical significance are similar to our baseline estimates in Table 3.
4.3.3 Remarks
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 confirm the broad evidence pre-
sented in Table 2: self-employed households tend to have more children. We have
demonstrated this result to be robust over key sub-samples of the data as well as
to alternative methods for estimating the parameters. As such, we believe we have
demonstrated that there is strong evidence in favor of our theory which is predicated
34Though not shown, the results are also unchanged when the sample is just whites who were not immigrants nor
were there parents.
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on the idea that self-employed households increase their number of children in order
to improve their chances of finding a match that improves the value of the business.
Nevertheless, doubts about the link between our theory and the evidence may
persist. And perhaps reasonably so. For example, one may conjecture that non-
pecuniary benefits of having children may be higher for the self-employed for at
least two reasons. First, the possibility exists that individuals may choose to be self-
employed because the self-employed spend less time at work, which then allows them
to spend more time with their children. Unfortunately, while we cannot fully test this
hypothesis with the GSS data, there is some evidence in the GSS data that suggests
just the opposite: namely, that the self-employed work more hours than fewer hours.
For example, the GSS asked the following question: “How many hours did you work
last week ”. Interestingly, the simple correlations between KIDS and KIDSTOT
with HOURS are −.013 and −.021, respectively, neither of which is statistically
different from zero. However, the correlation between SELFE and HOURS is .092,
which is statistically different from zero at below the .0001 level.35 Put in another
light, the average hours of worked for the self-employed is over 49 hours per week,
while that for the non self-employed is around 45. Hence, more time spent at work
suggests that self-employment does not free up extra hours with which to spend with
one’s children, the latter which would generally be expected to be associated with
respondents who prefer larger families. Finally, this mean gap of about 4 hours per
week remains statistically significant even if we include all the control variables used
in our control for all the explanatory variables in our estimating equation (4.5).36
However, while self-employed respondents may work about 10 percent more hours
35Again the sample is for MALE respondents, who are currently married, and neither they nor their spouses are
retired or in school. Since fewer responded to the hours question, the number of observations is about 3800.
36In other words, when we replace Ni with HOURS in regression (4.5), we find an effect equal to 3.8 hours with
a robust t-statistic of 6.8. Moreover, this estimate and level of significance is unchanged even if we also include the
instrument variables Z, which include industry dummy variables for the respondent.
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than non self-employed respondents, perhaps there is a sense in which these jobs are
more family friendly. Of course, while self-employment does provide some job flexi-
bility (i.e. as your own boss you don’t have to ‘punch a clock’), the additional hours
of work are likely to make other labor-leisure trade-offs more difficult to manage.37
The GSS actually provides a number of questions, though only for a limited time
period, about the extent to which work may impinge upon family obligations. For
example, in 1996, the GSS asked respondents whether work had ever made them
‘miss a family occasion or holiday,’ ‘been unable to care for a sick child or relative’,
or ‘been unable to do the work you usually do around the house’. Also, in 1998 they
asked how important were ‘the person’s family responsibilities?’ Importantly, the
responses to these questions were all insignificantly correlated with the respondent’s
self-employment status at or below the .1 level. Hence, self-employment (at least for
the male sub-sample we have considered) is not a bargain with respect to increased
flexibility towards family commitments. As such, this lessens the weight behind the
criticism that households choose self employment in response to a larger actual or
expected family size.38
4.4 Conclusion
Self-employed entities face unique challenges that separate them from other publicly-
owned enterprises. Aside from the profit-maximizing objective, self-employed indi-
viduals are typically concerned with ensuring that the business stays within the
family. Reconciling the two objectives, namely, the success of the business and the
37Hamilton (2000) reports that the self-employed tend to earn less and work more than individuals with similar
employment situations.
38In a recent important contribution, Frey and Benz (2003) provide evidence from Germany, the U.K. and Switzer-
land that self-employed are happier with their work not due to better financial outcomes, but rather because of non-
pecuniary benefits such as their work’s independence and lower level of hierarchy. This work extends Blanchflower
and Oswald’s (1998) and Blanchflower’s (2000) finding that the self-employed are happier than similarly employed
workers.
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control of the family over the business, implies that the parent must try to find a
match among his children that would also guarantee the success of the business.
We provide a theory whereby self-employed households have an inducement to
have more children in order to raise the expected return to their business. The
important mechanism which generates this is that having more children can increase
the likelihood that an inside family member will be a good match at running the
business. Using data from the General Social Survey, we find empirical support
for this finding. That is, overall, we demonstrate that there is a strong empirical
relationship between a respondent’s family size and self-employment status. We find
that, ceteris paribus, the self-employed have between .2 to .4 more actual and total
(that is, actual plus expected) children than do the non-self-employed. This finding
holds across a broad array of sub-samples in simple tests of the differences in means.
It also holds in empirical regressions when control variables are included, and when
the self-employment status of the respondent and whether the respondent’s spouse
stays at home are all allowed to be endogenous.
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Table 4.2: Tests for Differences in Means by Self-Employment Sta-
tus
MEANS
Sample Variable FULL SELFE NON-SELFE p-value NOBS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
ALL KIDS 1.83 2.05 1.80 .000 15010
KIDSTOT 2.09 2.24 2.07 .000 15010
ALL MALES KIDS 1.70 2.00 1.64 .000 6859
KIDSTOT 2.01 2.23 1.96 .000 6859
ALL FEMALES KIDS 1.94 2.12 1.92 .003 8151
KIDSTOT 2.16 2.25 2.15 .120 8151
MALES†
& BMAR KIDS 2.18 2.36 2.14 .000 5267
KIDSTOT 2.36 2.50 2.33 .003 5267
& MAR1 KIDS 2.13 2.34 2.08 .000 3372
KIDSTOT 2.34 2.49 2.31 .007 3372
& MAR KIDS 2.22 2.45 2.16 .000 4220
KIDSTOT 2.41 2.60 2.37 .000 4220
MALES† & MAR
& IMGR KIDS 2.14 2.56 2.07 .067 339
KIDSTOT 2.38 2.79 2.31 .086 339
& IMGRPAR KIDS 2.35 2.64 2.28 .020 782
KIDSTOT 2.52 2.78 2.46 .036 782
& CATH KIDS 2.36 2.58 2.32 .069 1161
KIDSTOT 2.61 2.83 2.57 .053 1161
& JEWISH KIDS 1.95 2.20 1.73 .082 84
KIDSTOT 2.06 2.28 1.86 .104 84
& PROTESTANT KIDS 2.23 2.46 2.18 .001 2471
KIDSTOT 2.42 2.59 2.37 .009 2471
& BLACK KIDS 2.66 3.07 2.62 .271 325
KIDSTOT 2.84 3.41 2.79 .190 325
& WHITE KIDS 2.17 2.40 2.12 .000 3735
KIDSTOT 2.37 2.55 2.33 .001 3735
& RACEOTH KIDS 2.33 3.15 2.17 .003 160
KIDSTOT 2.51 3.15 2.38 .017 160
& SPWRKH KIDS 2.58 2.82 2.52 .011 1440
KIDSTOT 2.76 2.92 2.72 .090 1440
& NON-SPWKRH KIDS 2.03 2.25 1.98 .000 2780
KIDSTOT 2.23 2.43 2.19 .001 2780
& CTYSZ1 KIDS 2.29 2.43 2.25 .082 1491
KIDSTOT 2.48 2.59 2.45 .179 1491
& CTYSZ2 KIDS 2.19 2.54 2.13 .000 1833
KIDSTOT 2.39 2.67 2.33 .001 1833
& CTYSZ3 KIDS 2.14 2.29 2.11 .232 693
KIDSTOT 2.34 2.41 2.33 .549 693
& CTYSZ4 KIDS 2.15 2.36 2.10 .366 203
KIDSTOT 2.39 2.69 2.32 .177 203
& RELINC12 KIDS 2.42 2.74 2.34 .009 825
KIDSTOT 2.64 2.85 2.60 .102 825
& RELINC3 KIDS 2.20 2.45 2.15 .003 2082
KIDSTOT 2.41 2.64 2.36 .005 2082
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
MEANS
Sample Variable FULL SELFE NON-SELFE p-value NOBS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
MALES† & MAR
& RELINC45 KIDS 2.12 2.28 2.07 .041 1313
KIDSTOT 2.27 2.42 2.24 .068 1313
& NEW ENGLAND KIDS 2.10 2.65 2.00 .021 252
KIDSTOT 2.30 2.89 2.20 .004 252
& MID-ATLANTIC KIDS 2.10 2.24 2.07 .295 667
KIDSTOT 2.28 2.41 2.25 .308 667
& CENTRAL NE KIDS 2.29 2.54 2.24 .052 912
KIDSTOT 2.50 2.67 2.47 .185 912
& CENTRAL NW KIDS 2.37 2.78 2.24 .011 388
KIDSTOT 2.53 2.93 2.41 .010 388
& SOUTH ATL. KIDS 2.05 2.48 1.96 .005 581
KIDSTOT 2.26 2.55 2.20 .064 581
& CENTRAL SE KIDS 2.22 2.18 2.22 .873 245
KIDSTOT 2.32 2.27 2.34 .782 245
& CENTRAL SW KIDS 2.34 2.47 2.31 .412 346
KIDSTOT 2.56 2.56 2.56 .975 346
& PACIFIC KIDS 2.12 2.08 2.13 .789 356
KIDSTOT 2.31 2.29 2.32 .862 356
& NO DIPLOMA KIDS 3.03 3.27 2.97 .153 634
KIDSTOT 3.15 3.38 3.09 .182 634
& HIGH SCHOOL KIDS 2.17 2.33 2.14 .026 2175
KIDSTOT 2.37 2.46 2.35 .201 2175
& JUNIOR COLLEGE KIDS 1.93 2.05 1.92 .694 227
KIDSTOT 2.26 2.57 2.23 .223 227
& BA KIDS 1.86 2.12 1.79 .018 749
KIDSTOT 2.07 2.34 2.00 .010 749
& GRAD KIDS 2.03 2.50 1.88 .000 435
KIDSTOT 2.20 2.59 2.07 .001 435
& AGRICULTURAL KIDS 2.77 2.85 2.62 0.455 166
KIDSTOT 2.96 2.96 2.95 0.966 166
& MINING KIDS 2.43 2.29 2.44 0.878 61
KIDSTOT 2.61 2.29 2.65 0.725 61
& CONSTRUCTION KIDS 2.39 2.54 2.32 0.217 452
KIDSTOT 2.59 2.73 2.52 0.261 452
& TRANSPORTATION KIDS 2.23 1.96 2.25 0.190 396
KIDSTOT 2.41 2.07 2.43 0.135 396
& WHOLESALE KIDS 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.999 205
KIDSTOT 2.40 2.38 2.41 0.896 205
& RETAIL KIDS 2.10 2.39 2.00 0.040 353
KIDSTOT 2.33 2.44 2.29 0.419 353
& FINANCE KIDS 2.18 2.37 2.08 0.054 552
KIDSTOT 2.39 2.54 2.32 0.142 552
& PUBLIC ADMIN. KIDS 2.11 2.67 2.10 0.319 375
KIDSTOT 2.28 3.00 2.27 0.033 375
& MANUFACTURING KIDS 2.26 2.38 2.25 0.493 1132
KIDSTOT 2.45 2.68 2.43 0.183 1132
& ENTERTAINMENT KIDS 1.78 1.57 1.84 0.645 32
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
MEANS
Sample Variable FULL SELFE NON-SELFE p-value NOBS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
MALES† & MAR
KIDSTOT 2.03 1.71 2.12 0.504 32
& PROFESSIONAL KIDS 2.07 2.42 1.98 0.004 572
KIDSTOT 2.26 2.53 2.20 0.024 572
Note: See Table 1 and Data Section 4.3.1. Column 1 reports the sample. Column 2 lists the measures
of the number of Children. Columns 3 − 5 report the mean number of Children for the full sub-sample
and then partitioned for the self-employed and non-self-employed portions of these sub-samples. Column 6
reports the p-value from the test (robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form) of the null hypothesis that
the means from the two partitioned sub-samples are identical. NOBS reports the number of observations.
MALES† are MALE respondents who are neither retired nor in school, nor are their spouses.
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Table 4.1: Sample Statistics
CORRELATIONS
VARIABLE MEAN STD MEDIAN KIDS KIDSTOT SELFE
KIDACT 2.215 1.593 2
KIDSTOT 2.411 1.546 2 .922∗∗∗
SELFE .182 .386 0 .069∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗
FINRELA 3.113 .827 3 −.064∗∗∗ −.079∗∗∗ .027∗
LMEX 23.2 12.8 21 .421∗∗∗ .294∗∗∗ .132∗∗∗
AGE 42.6 12.1 41 .392∗∗∗ .261∗∗∗ .150∗∗∗
GENERATION 1944.9 13.5 1947 −.390∗∗∗ −.302∗∗∗ −.134∗∗∗
SPWRKH .341 .474 0 .164∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗ .002
SIBS 3.812 3.194 3 .170∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗ −.034∗∗
DIPHR .850 .357 1 −.214∗∗∗ −.200∗∗∗ −.003
DIPJCR .054 .226 0 −.043∗∗∗ −.023 −.055∗∗∗
DIPBAR .177 .382 0 −.103∗∗∗ −.103∗∗∗ .029∗
DIPGDR .103 .304 0 −.040∗∗∗ −.047∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗
DIPHSP .590 .492 1 .010 .008 .000
DIPJCSP .061 .240 0 −.037∗∗∗ −.036∗∗ −.005
DIPBASP .157 .364 0 −.101∗∗∗ −.083∗∗∗ .031∗∗
DIPGDSP .057 .231 0 −.076∗∗∗ −.084∗∗∗ .007
BLACK .077 .267 0 .081∗∗∗ .080∗∗∗ −.074∗∗∗
WHITE .885 .319 1 −.076∗∗∗ −.074∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗
JEWISH .020 .140 0 −.024 −.032∗∗ .109∗∗∗
CATHOLIC .275 .447 0 .056∗∗∗ .078∗∗∗ −.052∗∗∗
PROTESTANT .586 .493 1 .014 .003 .020
IMGRNTR .080 .272 0 −.013 −.005 −.022
IMGRNTPA .160 .367 0 .035∗∗ .027∗ .019
IMGRNTMA .144 .351 0 .028∗ .026∗ .019
CTYSZ1 .353 .478 0 .032∗∗ .031∗∗ .068∗∗∗
CTYSZ2 .434 .496 0 −.011 −.014 −.050∗∗∗
CTYSZ3 .164 .371 0 −.021 −.020 −.025
CTYSZ4 .048 .214 0 −.010 −.003 .006
Note: The data sample size is 4220 and includes only currently married male respondents when neither
spouse is retired or in school, MALES† & MAR. See Data Section 4.3.1 and the Data Appendix for data
descriptions. Column 1 lists the variables. Columns 2 through 4 report the means, standard deviations and
medians. Columns 5 − 7 report the correlations between the variables listed in the rows with those listed
at the top of the columns. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate that the relationship is different from zero at or below
the .01, .05 and .10 level of statistical significance, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Baseline Regression of Number of Children on Self-Employment Status
Dep. Variable KIDS KIDSTOT
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
SELFE .139∗∗∗ .407∗∗ .161∗∗∗ .486∗∗∗
(.059) (.183) (.061) (.185)
SPWRKH .420∗∗∗ .553 .353∗∗∗ .030
(.049) (.627) (.050) (.643)
FINRELA −.066∗∗ −.062∗∗ −.074∗∗ −.079∗∗
(.029) (.030) (.029) (.031)
JEWISH −.084 −.170 −.097 −.188
(.175) (.179) (.177) (.180)
CATHOLIC .159∗∗∗ .170∗∗∗ .229∗∗∗ .252∗∗∗
(.058) (.059) (.059) (.060)
AGE .162∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ .057∗
(.023) (.034) (.024) (.035)
AGE2/100 −.184∗∗∗ −.189∗∗∗ −.091∗∗∗ −.082∗∗∗
(.013) (.022) (.014) (.022)
GENERATION −.015∗ −.014 −.013 −.018
(.008) (.012) (.008) (.012)
LMEX .039∗∗ .043∗∗ .026 .030
(.019) (.019) (.020) (.019)
SIBS .040∗∗∗ .040∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗ .048∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.011) (.011)
BLACK .765∗∗∗ .748∗∗ .708∗∗ .717∗∗
(.298) (.298) (.294) (.290)
WHITE −.042 −.056 −.012 −.007
(.169) (.168) (.163) (.160)
IMGRNTR .082 .074 .164 .175
(.139) (.138) (.140) (.137)
IMGRNTPA −.198∗∗ −.218∗∗ −.230∗∗ −.224∗∗
(.100) (.106) (.100) (.107)
IMGRNTMA −.073 −.057 −.085 −.083
(.109) (.109) (.111) (.110)
p-values
YEARS .623 .594 .000 .000
City Size .021 .026 .169 .191
Diplomas .000 .039 .002 .022
Region .000 .000 .000 .000





Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. Estimated standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form, in
parentheses. IV refers to two-step efficient GMM. The data sample is for MALES† & MAR, with 4220
observations in each regression. P-values for YEARS, City Size, Diplomas, Region and Ethnic Origin are
from F-tests from excluding the linearly independent time dummies, CITYSZ1-3, the eight respondent
and spouse diploma variables, seven Census regions and 34 Ethnic origin dummy variables, respectively.
Hausman is the p-value for the specification test that the coefficients on SELFE and SPWRKH are the
same across the OLS and IV estimates. J-test is the p-value for the Hansen test that the residuals are
uncorrelated with the instruments, Z. SELFE and SPOUSEH are p-values for the test that, in a first stage
regression, the coefficients on the instrumental variables Z are not all jointly equal to zero when regressed
against these variables.
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Table 4.4: Additional Regression on Total Number of Children (KIDSTOT)
SAMPLE KIDS > 0 SPOUSEH = 1 MAR1 = 1
ESTIMATOR OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV ) (V ) (V I)
SELFE .176∗∗∗ .605∗∗∗ .161 1.034∗∗∗ .103∗ .576∗∗∗
(.059) (.182) (.113) (.372) (.061) (.197)
SPWRKH .270∗∗∗ −.075 .366∗∗∗ .773
(.048) (.608) (.053) (.545)
FINRELA −.084∗∗∗ −.091∗∗∗ −.083 −.098 −.050 −.050
(.028) (.029) (.054) (.062) (.031) (.032)
JEWISH −.186 −.309∗ .013 −.172 −.027 −.186
(.164) (.167) (.285) (.272) (.174) (.182)
CATHOLIC .189∗∗∗ .215∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗ .327∗∗∗ .258∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗
(.057) (.058) (.107) (.120) (.061) (.063)
AGE .056∗∗∗ .047 .096∗∗ .085∗ .054∗∗ .064∗∗
(.023) (.035) (.045) (.045) (.026) (.033)
AGE2/100 −.074∗∗∗ −.064∗∗∗ −.123∗∗∗ −.122∗∗∗ −.076∗∗∗ −.088∗∗∗
(.013) (.023) (.021) (.021) (.014) (.022)
GENERATION −.018∗∗ −.022∗∗ −.008 −.013 −.010∗∗ −.005
(.008) (.011) (.016) (.016) (.009) (.011)
LMEX .020 .013 .035 .035 .036∗ .039∗
(.019) (.020) (.037) (.037) (.021) (.021)
SIBS .048∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ .065∗∗∗ .065∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗ .051∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.019) (.019) (.012) (.012)
BLACK .572∗∗ 2.629∗∗ .824∗ .978∗∗ .995∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗
(.292) (1.138) (.456) (.496) (.307) (.311)
WHITE −.085 −.173 .133 .213 .097 .124
(.160) (.173) (.295) (.328) (.153) (.154)
IMGRNTR .052 .068 .110 .112 .088 .094
(.131) (.128) (.260) (.250) (.153) (.158)
IMGRNTPA −.154 −.147 −.214 −.208 −.234∗∗ −.253∗∗
(.097) (.105) (.159) (.154) (.104) (.110)
IMGRNTMA −.024 −.005 −.193 −.207 −.060 −.065
(.105) (.106) (.190) (.183) (.120) (.123)
NOBS 3780 3780 1436 1436 3360 3360
p-values
YEARS .000 .000 .121 .126 .000 .000
City Size .601 .178 .209 .425 .397 .575
Diplomas .001 .009 .080 .047 .005 .179
Region .000 .000 .008 .008 .000 .000
Ethnic Origin .000 .129 .000 .030 .001 .001
Hausman .015 .014 .037
J-test .562 .270 .845
SELFE .126 .000 .000
SPOUSEH .100 .014
Note: See following page.
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Table 4.5: Additional Regression on Total Number of Children (KIDSTOT): CONTINUED
SAMPLE AG = 0 IMGRNT = 0 ALL ALL ALL
ESTIMATOR OLS IV OLS IV TOBIT IV TOBIT OPRBT
(V II) (V III) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII)
SLFEMPR .144∗∗∗ .494∗ .116∗ .645∗∗∗ .155∗∗ .499∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗
(.065) (.263) (.066) (.195) (.063) (.190) (.045)
SPWRKH .343∗∗∗ .087 .408∗∗∗ .280 .400∗∗∗ .131 .272∗∗∗
(.051) (.717) (.057) (.713) (.052) (.683) (.037)
FINRELA −.084∗∗∗ −.090∗∗∗ −.075∗∗ −.076∗∗ −.077∗∗∗ −.082∗∗ −.048∗∗
(.030) (.031) (.032) (.033) (.031) (.033) (.022)
JEWISH −.112 −.211 −.088 −.207 −.068 −.162 −.090
(.179) (.190) (.229) (.236) (.210) (.217) (.144)
CATHOLIC .221∗∗∗ .243∗∗∗ .269∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗ .263∗∗∗ .182∗∗∗
(.060) (.062) (.065) (.065) (.063) (.065) (.044)
AGE .082∗∗∗ .066∗ .069∗∗ .054 .091∗∗∗ .078∗∗ .066∗∗∗
(.024) (.036) (.027) (.039) (.024) (.037) (.017)
AGESQ/100 −.095∗∗∗ −.088∗∗∗ −.094∗∗∗ −.091∗∗∗ −.106∗∗∗ −.100∗∗∗ −.072∗∗∗
(.014) (.024) (.015) (.024) (.014) (.024) (.010)
GENERATION −.014 −.019 −.012 −.013 −.013 −.016 −.010
(.008) (.013) (.009) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.006)
LMEX .021 .026 .035 .046∗∗ .027 .031 .013
(.020) (.020) (.023) (.023) (.018) (.019) (.013)
SIBS .048∗∗∗ .047∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .051∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗
(.011) (.011) (.012) (.013) (.008) (.008) (.006)
RACEBL .742∗∗ .750∗∗ .816∗∗ 1.290 .786∗∗∗ .831∗∗∗ .445∗∗
(.301) (.298) (.400) (1.469) (.273) (.276) (.196)
RACEWH .014 .015 .247 .736 .007 .038 .029
(.166) (.162) (.274) (.634) (.173) (.175) (.116)
IMGRNTR .144 .153 .204 .225 .145
(.143) (.141) (.167) (.169) (.103)
IMGRNTPA −.191∗ −.187∗ −.272∗∗∗ −.251∗∗∗ −.173∗∗∗
(.101) (.110) (.104) (.112) (.074)
IMGRNTMA −.111 −.103 −.095 −.117 −.073
(.110) (.111) (.112) (.114) (.080)
NOBS 4036 4036 3407 3407 4220 4220 4220
p-values
YEARS .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
City Size .228 .236 .462 .439 .111 .117 .235
Diplomas .002 .028 .017 .183 .004 .024 .008
Region .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Ethnic Origin .001 .008 .001 .168 .007 .009 .000
Hausman .141 .005 .078
J-test .236 .645 .820
SELFE .000 .000 .001
SPOUSEH .038 .098 .046
Note: See Tables 1, 2 and 3. In columns denoted OLS, IV, TOBIT, IVTOBIT and OPRBT, the coefficients
were estimated using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, tobit, instrumental variables tobit, and
ordered probit, respectively. As in Tables 1 and 3, the data set only includes only married males who are not
retired, nor are their spouses (MALES† & MAR). In columns (I) and (II), the data set removes respondents
who have no current children. In columns (III) and (IV), the data set includes only those respondents
whose spouses stay at home. In columns (V) and (VI), the data set includes only those respondents who
have been married once. In columns (VII) and (VIII), the data set removes respondents in the agricultural
industry. In columns (IX) and (X), the data set removes respondents who are immigrants or if either of
their parents were immigrants.
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Table 4.6: Data Appendix
Variables Used in the Analysis
Key Variables of Interest
KIDS The number of children respondent has ever had (includes those born from a
previous marriage).
KIDSTOT The number of children respondent has plus the additional number they
expect to have.
SELFE Dummy variable 1 if self-employed 0 if works for someone else.
Additional Control Variables
AGE Age of Respondent.
BLACK Dummy variable 1 if race is black, and 0 otherwise.
BMAR Dummy variable 1 if respondent has ever been married, and 0 otherwise.
CATHOLIC Dummy variable 1 if religion preference is Catholic, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ1 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is less than
10,000, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ2 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is greater
than or equal to 10,000 but less than 100,000, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ3 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is greater
than or equal to 100,000 but less than 1 million, and 0 otherwise.
CTYSZ4 Dummy variable 1 if population at which interview took place is greater
than or equal to 1 million but less than 9 million 0 otherwise.
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DIPHR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received was
from a high-school or GED certificate, and 0 if not.
DIPJCR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received was
from a junior college, and 0 if not.
DIPBAR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received
was from a 4 year college, and 0 if not.
DIPHGDR(S) Dummy variable 1 if respondent’s (spouse) highest degree received
was from a Graduate School, and 0 if not.
Ethnic Origin The Country the respondent’s ancestors came from: Africa, Aus-
tria, French Canada, Other Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Eng-
land, Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Dutch Holland, Norway, Philippians, Poland, Puerto Rico,
Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Indies, Other.
FINRELA The respodent’s household financial income relative to others. It is
measured on a self reported scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being that your financial
status is well below the mean, and 5 being that it is far above the mean.
IMGRNT Dummy variable 1 if respondent was not born in the U.S., and 0 other-
wise.
IMGRNTMA Dummy variable 1 if respondents mother was not born in the U.S.,
and 0 otherwise.
IMGRNTPA Dummy variable 1 if respondents father was not born in the U.S.,
and 0 otherwise.
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Industry Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Whole-
sale, Retail, Finance (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), Entertainment,
PROFESSIONAL (Professional Services), Administration.
JEWISH Dummy variable 1 if religion preference is Jewish , and 0 otherwise.
LMEX Respondent’s labor market experience. Equal to Age minus years of school
minus 6.
MALES Dummy variable 1 if male, and 0 if female.
MALES† Dummy variable 1 if MALES and if neither respondent nor spouse are in
school or retired, and 0 otherwise.
MAR Dummy variable 1 if currently married, and 0 otherwise.
MAR1 Dummy variable 1 if respondent is currently married or widowed and never
been previously married, and 0 otherwise.
PROTESTANT Dummy variable 1 if religion preference is Protestant, and 0 oth-
erwise.
SIBS Number of siblings respondent has (includes those no longer alive, stepbroth-
ers, stepsisters and children adopted by parents).
YRSCHR Number of years of schooling.
WHITE Dummy variable 1 if race is white, and 0 otherwise.
Regions New England, Mid-Atlantic, Central NE (North East), Central SE (South
East), South Atlantic, Central SE, Central SW, and Pacific.
SPWRKH Dummy variable 1 if respondents spouse work status a week prior to
the interview is either taking care of the house or student, and 0 if spwrk = 1.
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4.5 Appendix
In period one, individuals choose the number of children they would like to have,
n, as well as the amount of net-savings they would like to have to support themselves
during their retirement in period 2. For simplicity, the interest rate on net-savings,
NS, is assumed to be zero, and let α be the per-child cost of having children. Hence
their period 1 consumption is equal to lifetime labor income less net-savings plus
child costs and their period 2 consumption is equal to savings. Such individuals who
work for a firm, therefore, maximize:
(4.6) max
{n,NS}
W F = θ · n + U(V −NS − α · n) + U(NS)
where θ represents a household’s exogenous and random preference for children.
The two optimality conditions are straightforward:
(4.7) U ′(cF1 ) = U
′(cF2 )
(4.8) θ = α · U ′(cF1 )
Equation (4.7) indicates that the individual maximizes consumption by equating
his/her marginal utility across time, whereas equation (4.8) demonstrates that the
number of children is chosen to equate the marginal benefit of a child to its marginal
cost. Equations (4.7) (4.8) solve for the optimal number of children and level of
net-savings for those who work for firms, namely nF and NSF .
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation presented three chapters on labor and development economics.
The first two chapters investigated the role of food aid in rural Ethiopia. Findings
showed that agency problems may be an important problem in targeting aid to
intended beneficiaries and that agents are more likely to distort the distribution
of aid receipts than the set of aid recipients. Our study also suggests that informal
structures of power within African villages can influence the extent to which food aid
insulates some of the world’s poorest families from agricultural shocks. Conditional
on receiving aid, results also show that aid has significant health effects on the poor.
In fact, adults that were the most malnourished benefited the most from receiving
aid. The final chapter examined the fertility decisions of self-employed men in the
United States. Using data from the General Social Survey, we find that respondents
have approximately .2 to .4 more actual and expected number of children if they are
self-employed as compared to if they are not self-employed.
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